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Comment
OH, I'M SORRY, DID THAT IDENTITY BELONG TO YOU? HOW
IGNORANCE, AMBIGUITY, AND IDENTITY THEFT
CREATE OPPORTUNITY FOR IMMIGRATION
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
"No subject touches the essence of the American experience more
fundamentally than immigration, for our history is that of a heterogene-

ous people in quest of a homogeneous national identity."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, Mr. Nassim Mohamed Leon, a Tanzanian man who legally
immigrated to the United States and subsequently became a naturalized
citizen, achieved a feat in defiance of the law of physics: being in two
places at once. 2 While Mr. Leon was taken into custody for immigration
3
violations, he was also somewhere else, completely unaware of the arrest.
Identity theft made this feat possible; prior to 2004, Nicholas Montejo, a
Mexican national who illegally immigrated to the United States, stole Mr.
Leon's identity. 4 During a successful attempt to obtain employment, Mr.
Montejo provided an employer with a false alien registration card bearing
his own name and photograph, but fabricated numbers that belonged to
Mr. Leon. 5 In addition, Mr. Montejo also used a fraudulent social security
6
card, bearing a second set of numbers belonging to another victim. Following his arrest related to the immigration violation and the identity
1. VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR
FORCE 1 (1984) (introducing author's book on immigration policy in United
States).
2. See United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 2006) (reciting
facts of case).
3. See id. (explaining theft of Montejo's identity).
4. See id. (detailing identity theft against Mr. Leon). At trial, Montejo did not
dispute the facts of the case, but instead asserted only that he lacked actual knowledge that the means of identification belonged to real people. See id. at 214-15
(discussing Montejo's trial). Montejo was found guilty of both an underlying offense and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (1). See id.
at 215 (noting conviction). Montejo was sentenced to two years in prison related
to aggravated identity theft and two years supervised release, as well as a $300 special assessment. See id. (detailing sentence). Montejo challenged the district
court's interpretation of the scienter requirement's breadth, but lost his appeal.
See id. at 217 (reasoning that government does not need to prove that defendant
actually knew means of identification belonged to real person). For a further discussion of aggravated identity theft, see infra notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
5. See id. at 214 (providing details of identity theft).
6. See id. (discussing second instance of identity theft).

(369)
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theft, Mr. Montejo explained that in 2002 he simply walked into the

United States and purchased the false alien registration and social security
cards for $60. 7 He also admitted that he knew the documents were false
when he purchased them to gain employment. 8
Beginning in 2006, Mr. Dinicio Gurrola III achieved the same unfavorable superhuman feat as Mr. Leon. 9 Mr. Nicasio Mendoza-Gonzalez,
an illegal immigrant, used Mr. Gurrola's identity and represented himself
as a "citizen or national of the United States" when he completed a form
in connection with his employment at a pork processing plant in Marshalltown, Iowa. 10 Specifically, in order to verify his false identity, Mr.
Mendoza-Gonzalez submitted a photo identification card in the name of
Mr. Gurrola. 11 Subsequently, the employer verified that the provided information matched Mr. Gurrola's social security number and the employer allowed Mr. Mendoza-Gonzalez to keep working at the plant. 12 Mr.
Mendoza-Gonzalez's employment continued until December 12, 2006,
when officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement raided the
pork processing plant and arrested him.1"
Similarly, Mr. Gustavo Villanueva-Sotelo is a Mexican national who
has illegally entered the United States three times and has been deported
twice, each time following incarceration. 14 After his third entrance into
the country, police stopped Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo and asked him for identification; Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo provided the police officers with a permanent resident card bearing his own name, photograph, and country of
15
Mr. Villanuevaorigin, but someone else's alien registration number.
16
fake.
a
was
card
the
knew
he
that
Sotelo admitted
7. See id. (describing ease with which identity was stolen).

8. See id. (noting that defendant possessed knowledge that identities were
falsified).
9. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that government must prove that defendant knew means of identification
actually belonged to another person), petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S.July 15, 2008) (No.
08-5316).

10. See id. at 913-14 (recounting case facts).
11. See id. at 914 (detailing specific facts of defendant's act of identity theft).
12. See id. (providing further details of defendant's identity theft).
13. See id. (noting defendant's arrest).
14. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (recounting facts of case), petitionfor cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov.
7, 2008) (No. 08-622).
15. See id. (describing defendant's act of identity theft).
16. See id. (noting defendant's knowledge of falsified documents). Villanueva-Sotelo was charged with unlawful entry of a removed alien in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) (1), possession of a fraudulent document prescribed for
authorized stay or employment in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1546(a), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
See id. (detailing charges against Villanueva-Sotelo). Villanueva-Sotelo pleaded
guilty to the first two charges, but challenged the aggravated identity theft charge.

See id. (noting defense strategy).
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Despite these three men illegally entering the United States, obtaining documents they knew were falsified, being aware that the identities
potentially belonged to others, and using the identifications to further
their illegal residency, each of the three men, and others like them, could
ultimately escape serious punishment, leaving innocent victims at risk for
substantial economic and social injury. 17 Whether or not they will evade
punishment depends on the resolution of a developing controversy regarding the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (ITPEA). i s Currently, circuit courts are split as to whether the government must prove
that a person, who committed identity theft in the course of committing
one of ITPEA's enumerated underlying felonies, actually knew the identity
belonged to another person in order to trigger ITPEA's mandatory twoyear sentencing enhancement. 19 The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the government does not need to prove the defendant actually knew the identity belonged to another person, while the First,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits take the opposite position. 20 The confusion surrounding the breadth of ITPEA's scienter requirement results from inherVillanueva-Sotelo avoided significant punishment, as the appellate court required the government to prove that Villanueva-Sotelo knew the registration number actually belonged to someone else, which the government could not do. See id.
at 1236-37 (discussing actual knowledge element of aggravated identity theft
charge). The district court judge granted Villanueva-Sotelo's motion to dismiss
the aggravated identity theft charge because the government did not prove that
the defendant knew that the means of identification belonged to another person.
See id. (explaining that actual knowledge element was not met). The government
appealed, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the district court's
ruling. See id. at 1250 (holding that government must prove defendant knew
means of identification actually belonged to another person). As a result, Villanueva-Sotelo escaped the two year penalty enhancement. See id. at 1246 (discussing holding). For a further discussion of aggravated identity theft, see infra notes
91-151 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the common injuries suffered by identity theft victims,
see infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (1) (2004) (criminalizing aggravated identity theft).
For further discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
19. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining
that "[t]he circuits are divided on the issue of whether the 'knowingly' scienter
requirement in § 1028A(a) (1) extends to 'of another person"').
20. Compare United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that "§ 1028A(a) (1) is unambiguous and that the Government was
not required to prove that [the defendant] knew [the victim] was a real person to
prove that he violated § 1028A(a) (1)"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15, 2008)
(No. 08-5316), United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (11th Cir. 2007)
(same), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008), and United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d
213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same), with Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (relying on rule of
lenity to hold that "the scienter requirement must stretch to 'of another person'"),
United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on
rule of lenity, court held "that the government was required to prove that [the
defendant] knew that the identification belonged to another person"), and Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1245 (holding that viewing statute "as a whole . . . we
think it clear that Congress never intended its 'aggravated identity theft' statute to
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ent ambiguity in the statute's language. 2 1 The split has far-reaching
implications because Messrs. Montejo, Mendoza-Gonzalez, and VillanuevaSotelo's respective stories are not the exception. 22 With almost twelve million undocumented and illegal aliens in the United States who require
identification to obtain jobs and avoid detection, these three examples potentially represent the tip of the iceberg for this form of identity theft of
innocent, unsuspecting, and legitimate citizens and immigrants of the
23
United States.
Indeed, this pervasive issue offers Congress an opportunity to provide
significant immigration reform, which is desperately needed to address
the approximately 470,000 immigrants who illegally enter the United
States annually. 24 In addition to identity theft, illegal immigration creates
a variety of security and economic problems. 25 This Comment demonstrates that legislative intervention into the circuit split over ITPEA is both
necessary and advantageous. 26 The Supreme Court will resolve the circuit
split in 2009, and this Comment predicts that the resolution will be unfavorable to the concept of justice and the security of both United States'
citizens and legitimate immigrants. 2 7 Therefore, Part II of this Comment
provides context for immigration reform's necessity by reviewing immigration policy in the United States since 1980 and explaining recent developreach conduct like [the defendant's]"). For further discussion of the circuit split,
see infra notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
21. For discussion of the ambiguity inherent in the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (ITPEA), see infra notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
22. See generally MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., EsTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED
STATES: JAN. 2007 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statis-

tics/publications/ois-ill-pe_2007.pdf (providing statistics on illegal immigration
into United States).
23. See id. at 2 (charting illegal immigration population from 2000 through
2007).
24. See id. at 1 ("Between 2000 and 2007, the unauthorized population increased 3.3 million; the annual average increase during this period was 470,000.").
For further discussion of the statistics related to illegal immigration, see infra notes
65-69 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the injuries suffered by victims of identity theft, see
infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the need for congressional action to narrow the scienter requirement, see infra notes 163-91 and accompanying text.
27. See Associated Press, Supreme Court to Decide Identity Theft Case: Case to Consider If Immigrants with Phony IDs Should Face More Charges, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 20,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27282580/ [hereinafter Supreme Court to
Decide] (reporting on Supreme Court granting certiorari on identity theft issue);
see also United States v. Flores-Figueroa, 274 Fed. Appx. 501 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding narrow scienter requirement), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 457 (2008). For a
discussion of the circuit split's likely resolution, see infra notes 145-51. For a discussion of the impact of the resolution of the circuit split, see infra notes 188-205
and accompanying text.
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ments, or the lack thereof, in national policy. 28 Part III clarifies the circuit
split by synthesizing circuit courts' opinions and predicts the Supreme
Court's resolution of the split. 29 As part of this discussion, Part III examines the inherent ambiguity of ITPEA, suggests the most judicially responsible resolution to the circuit split (the expansive scienter requirement),
and presents a relevant consideration for courts that interpret ITPEA but
ultimately disagree with the expansive scienter requirement. 30 Part IV explores the victimization of identity theft and the negative implications of
ITPEA's expansive scienter requirement, as well as demonstrates the po31
tential for immigration reform.
II.

A.

IMMIGRATION REFORM

IN THE UNITED STATES

Contemporary Immigration Policy (1980-2005)

By 1980, immigrants achieved "illegal" status in one of two ways: (1)
entering the United States in a surreptitious manner; for example, by sailing across the nation's sea border or walking across the nation's land border, or (2) entering the United States through a port of entry, but
subsequently violating the terms of their visas; for example, by committing
a crime or overstaying their visas. 3 2 Unfortunately for such immigrants,
28. For an overview of United States immigration policy since 1980, see infra
notes 32-90 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of immigration policy
prior to 1980, see infra note 32.
29. For discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
30. For discussion ofjudicial resolution of the circuit split, see infra notes 14551 and accompanying text.
31. For discussion of immigration reform and its advantages, see infra notes
192-205 and accompanying text.
32. See HOEFER ET AL., supranote 22, at 1 ("The unauthorized resident immigrant population is defined as all foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents. Unauthorized residents refer to foreign-born persons who entered the
United States without inspection or were admitted temporarily and stayed past the
date they were required to leave."); see also BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 130 (explaining
two classifications of illegal immigrants).
The quantitative monitoring of immigration began in 1921, when, in the wake of
the First World War and the onset of the Red Scare, the United States plunged
into isolationism, which led to the passage of the Quota Act of 1921. See DANIEL J.
TICHENOR, DMDING LINES 143 (2002) (providing context for passage of Quota Act
of 1921). The Quota Act of 1921, regarded as an "emergency act," was renewed
through 1924 to establish national quotas for immigration based on the number of
foreign-born residents of each nationality living in the United States at the time of
the 1910 census. See BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing Quota Act of 1921 and
explaining that immigration was capped at 385,000 annually with preference for
Western Europeans); TICHENOR, supra, at 143, 150 (explaining that Quota Act of
1921 favored family of legal immigrants and although regarded only as emergency
legislature was renewed by Congress); CAROLYN WONG, LOBBYING FOR INCLUSION:
RIGHTS POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 47 (2006) (noting that
Quota Act was first American immigration law that utilized numerical limits). In
1924, Congress updated the legislation and utilized the National Origins Formula,
which based the quotas on the makeup of the national origins of the American

population as a whole, and further restricted immigration from Europe and Asia.
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the period between 1980 and 2005 brought remarkable changes in immigration policy, with a focus on illegal immigration. 33 One commentator
See TICHENOR, supra, at 44 (describing further restrictions imposed by Immigration
Act of 1924); WONG, supra, at 47-48 (noting that Immigration Act of 1924 limited
not only total number of immigrants, but also controlled racial and ethnic makeup
of immigrant population). The legislation also instituted the utilization of visas.
See BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 46 (noting genesis of visas). Subsequently, in 1952,
Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act, which continued the national origins
quota system but added a preference system based upon job skills and family
reunification and made it easier to deport immigrants suspected of communist
activities. See id. at 58-60 (detailing history of McCarran-Walter Act and outlining
its legislative impact); TICHENOR, supra, at 189-97 (same); WONG, supra, at 49 (discussing perpetuation of quota system). The altered quota system was finally blown
apart in 1965, on the heels of the Civil Rights Act, when Congress passed the HartCellar Act, which dismantled the quota system and provided 170,000 visas for immigrants originating the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 visas for Western Hemisphere immigrants. See BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 62-66 (presenting context and
history of Hart-Cellar Act); TICHENOR, supra, at 211-26 (same); WONG, supra, at 5063 (providing thorough analysis of legislation and its impact).
During the same period, policymakers saw Mexican guestworkers as a source
of cheap labor, which the country desperately needed during the Second World
War. See BRicGs, supra note 1, at 151-52 (arguing that "bureaucrats and members
of -ongress not only allowed, but invited, Mexican immigration during this period. . . . [P]olicymakers aggressively recruited a large supply of Mexican
guestworkers to provide primarily cheap agricultural labor"). The United States
negotiated an agreement with the Mexican government on a guestworker program, commonly referred to as the "Bracero Program," which included protections for migrant workers, although the terms of the agreement were never
enforced. See id. at 98-99 (detailing "Bracero Program"); TICHENOR, supra, at 16775 (same); WONG, sup-a, at 64 (same). Also, because cheap labor was needed, the
government essentially turned a blind eye to illegal immigration, and permissible
illegal immigration from Mexico persisted until 1954, when the newly formed Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) undertook "Operation Wetback." See
TiCHENOR, supra, at 202 (recounting that INS launched "a military-style campaign
to seize and deport Latino illegal aliens en masse"). The operation sought to remove over one million illegal immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants, from
the southwestern United States. See TICHENOR, supra, at 202 (noting objective of
Operation Wetback and quoting one general who justified Operation Wetback as a
necessary "drive against illegal Mexican labor," in order to "wipe out the disease,
criminal activity, juvenile delinquency, and social instability that attends any 'wetback' invasion"). Then, in 1964, the Bracero Program ended. SeeTICHENOR, supra,
at 224 (explaining that "[t ] he termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 was led
by the AFL-CIO, which loathed the importation of temporary Mexican workers to
harvest seasonal crops at low wages and under poor working conditions"). For a
more critical depiction of United States' legislation and policy toward Mexicans
during this period, see Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the United States: Invitation

and Exile, in

IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IM-

OF THE UNITED STATES 190-200 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
33. See TIcHENOR, supra note 32, at 242 (arguing that from 1975-2000 American politics "witnessed remarkable transformations ... policymakers focused their
attention in these years on a problem that seemed to highlight the extent to which
national borders had become porous and inadequately regulated: illegal
immigration")
It should be noted, however, that the number of legal immigrants entering
the United States during this period soared, as the policies of the period also provided new opportunities for legal entry into the country. See id. at 243 (exploring
PULSE

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss2/6

6

Hovey: Oh, I'm Sorry, Did That Identity Belong to You: How Ignorance, Am
2009]

COMMENT

explained that the "American public, convinced that the country had lost
control of its borders, readily embraced harsh crackdowns on illegal immigration, significant reductions in legal immigration... and limits on public benefits for aliens residing in the country." 34 In one poll, over 90% of
35
respondents supported an "all-out effort to stop" illegal immigration.
An impetus for new immigration policies arose from the Supreme
Court's 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe,3 6 which held that undocumented
children had a Fourtt -:'th Amendment right to public education. 37 In
the Plyler decision, Justice Brennan wrote, " [t]his situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens encouraged by
some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied
the benefits our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. '" 8
One commentator called the Supreme Court's decision "a stinging indictment of federal inaction," and asserted that the decision served as a catalyst in a polarized political climate to drive Congress to finally address the
39
employment of illegal immigrants.
In 1986, four years later, Congress finally provided a solution, which it
proudly regarded as humane, with the Immigration Reform and Control
positive side of period's immigration policies and stating that "the immigration
controls established from 1980 to 1990 were decidedly expansive for alien admissions and rights"); cf. BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 246 (commenting that "[t]he fact
that the United States continues to accept a substantial number of legal immigrants . . . is a feature that sharply distinguishes it from other industrialized
nations").
34. TiCHENOR, supra note 32, at 242 (relating public sentiment during period
and into current political climate).
35. See id. at 243 (reporting results of public opinion poll).
36. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Giving rise to this case, the Texas Legislature revised
its education laws in 1975 to deny public education to children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States. See id. at 205 (reciting case facts).
37. See id. at 23940 (asserting that denial of public education to children of
illegal immigrants violates Fourteenth Amendment). The Court concluded that
the state's classification of the children "deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded [to] all other children simply because they have been
assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their parents." See id. at 238
(explaining negative consequence of classification based on parents' legal status).
Consequently, the Court determined that the classification had to pass heightened
scrutiny, which it failed because the children "have been singled out for a lifelong
penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an
underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the
fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." See id. at 238-39 (presenting basis for Court's holding).
38. Id. at 218-19 (renouncing Texas's classification).
39. See TiCHENOR, supra note 32, at 257 (analyzing Plyler decision). In 1983,
Congress attempted to pass an immigration reform bill that included a
guestworker program and civil rights protection to legal aliens, but the bill died in
the House of Representatives amid rumors that the White House would veto the
bill in order to court Hispanic voters. See id. at 257-58 (explaining details of 1983
immigration reform bill and its eventual demise).
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Act (IRCA). 40 IRCA both offered amnesty to illegal immigrants who were
fueling our economy by creating a guestworker program, and also included sanctions against employers who hire illegal immigrants in the future. 4 1 Although IRCA was initially viewed positively, its long-term impact
is controversial. 42 IRCA essentially granted amnesty to over three million
illegal immigrants present in the United States, but failed to extinguish
the tide of annual illegal immigration flooding into the country because
the regulations did not effectively curb the employment prospects of future illegal immigrants. 43 IRCA's inability to curtail the employment of
future illegal immigrations stems from IRCA's failure to institute a satisfactory identification system that employers could utilize to determine an em44
ployee's eligibility for employment.

40. See id. at 258-62, 263-67 (discussing Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA)); WONG, supra note 32, at 95-101 (same).
41. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 258-62, 263-67 (discussing IRCA); WONG,
supra note 32, at 95-101 (same). IRCA included a voluntary verification program
for employers to check the status of their employees, but made it illegal for employers to hire illegal immigrants. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 260 (detailing
compromises made in IRCA from previous proposals); WONG, supra note 32, at 96
(noting that employer sanctions had been debated for fifteen years before becoming reality). Passage of IRCA, however, was contentious over two aspects: amnesty
and guestworkers. See WONG, supra note 32, at 99-101 (recounting legislative pathway to passage). On the issue of amnesty, one commentator noted that "[n] o politician was advocating the mass deportation of illegal immigrants," but
disagreement existed over the expansiveness of the terms of the amnesty. See id. at
100 (explaining disagreement on issue of amnesty). Interestingly, Congress allowed illegal immigrants to apply for amnesty with designated community organizations, rather than the INS, because it expected illegal immigrants would fear
registering directly with the government. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 264 (discussing "qualified designated entities"). With respect to the guestworker program,
traditionally guestworkers would finish their work and be legally obligated to leave
the country, but Democrats wanted to create a pathway to citizenship for people
who contributed to the nation's economy. See WONG, supra note 32, at 100 (explaining disagreement over guestworkers program). Congress reached a compromise on this issue, and IRCA narrowly passed, with a vote of 216 to 211. See id. at
100-01 (summarizing passed Act).
The legislation intended to target employment of illegal immigrants because
Congress believed that "employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally." See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-723(i), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649-50) (applying IRCA).
42. See TICHENk.'., supra note 32, at 262 (explaining that "[a]lmost from the
outset, the odds were stacked against employer sanctions working effectively to
curb illegal immigration").
43. See id. (considering IRCA's shortcomings). The lack of a reliable identification system allowed illegal immigrants to easily avoid detection, which enabled
an "underground industry of fraudulent documents" to flourish. See id. (criticizing
IRCA's ineffective identification verification scheme).
44. See id. (noting that "absence of a reliable identification system" doomed
employer sanctions under IRCA from start).
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Then, in 1990, Congress continued its crackdown on illegal immigra-

tion with the Immigration Act of 1990. 4 5 The Act addressed IRCA's inadequacies by increasing funding for border patrol and implementing a test
program for a more secure driver's license that could be used to verify
employee eligibility. 46 Also, the Act granted amnesty to family members
of those previously granted amnesty in 1986, expanded employment-based
visas, and eliminated sexual and ideological preferences in visas that
lingered from Cold War immigration legislation. 4 7 Finally, the Act increased the number of visas available to highly skilled workers, which were
48
in demand with the onset of the technology boom.
Nevertheless, this congressional action did not quell public discon49
tent, as evidenced by California's passage of Proposition 187 in 1994.
Proposition 187's purpose was to deny illegal immigrants and their chil50
dren welfare benefits, non-emergency healthcare, and public education.
45. See id. at 267-74 (examining Immigration Act of 1990); WONG, supra note
32, at 101-07 (same). Before submitting the bill for the Immigration Act of 1990,
Senators Kennedy, Simon, and Simpson, cosponsors of the bill, asserted in a joint
statement that:
We believe this compromise bill is a balanced attempt to serve the national interest; it preserves the immigration rights of those who have close
family connections in this country; it stimulates immigration from earlier
sources of immigration to our country that have contributed so much to
America in the past; and it promotes the entry of those who are selected
specifically for their ability to contribute their needed skills and talents to
the development of our country.
See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 270-71 (relating joint statement of cosponsors)
(citation omitted).
46. See id. at 273-74 (noting that conservatives were able to include some modest reforms directed at illegal immigration). Restrictionists were also able to limit
the legal rights of criminal aliens facing deportation. See id. at 274.
47. See id. at 267-74 (recounting successes of legislation). For a discussion of
the McCarran-Walter Act, which instituted the ideological and sexual preferences,
see supra note 32.
48. See WONG, supra note 32, at 101 (discussing visas for highly skilled work-

ers). A final report released in 1981 by the Select Commission on U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy stimulated a comprehension of the need for highly skilled
workers in American industry, and in particular, projected a labor shortage for
technology and computer companies. See id. (examining Select Commission on
U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy report of 1981). As a result, the Immigration
Act of 1990 included an increase of visas for much needed labor. See id. (explaining how Immigration Act adapted to predictions of labor shortages).
49. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 274-77 (discussing California Proposition
187); WONG, supra note 32, at 133 (discussing Proposition 187, and noting that
"the most populous state of the Union, California, was witnessing a groundswell of
public opinion against illegal immigration"). A poll conducted just prior to the
1994 mid-term election showed that voters placed the issue of illegal immigration
just behind crime and welfare reform. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 277
(describing poll).
50. See id. at 275 (explaining that Proposition 187's purpose was to deny illegal immigrants and their children public services); WONG, supra note 32, at 133
(noting that Proposition 187 was "an initiative to deny public services to illegal
immigrants"). The initiative was a grassroots effort, and it thrust the issue of illegal
immigration to the forefront of the nation's political dialogue. See TICHENOR,
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The strong public discontent over illegal immigration became further exacerbated in 1994, following the World Trade Center bombing by Islamic
terrorists, who had illegally entered the United States virtually unfettered. 5 1 In 1996, Congress again sought to address these concerns and
provide an effective solution by passing the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 5 2 IIRIRA "enhanced the government's ability to guard national borders . . .limited immigrant access

to public benefits, required U.S. financial sponsors for newcomers, and
53
established stringent provisions for criminal and undocumented aliens."
Following the turn of the century, however, public sentiments toward
illegal aliens were again enflamed by the terrorist attack on September 11,
2001, when nineteen Islamic terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes
and flew two into the World Trade Center in New York City and one into
the Pentagon. 54 The fourth failed to reach its target and, due to the heroic intervention of passengers on the flight, crashed in Pennsylvania, raising the total number of causalities to almost 3,000 people. 55 Five of the
56
hijackers were illegal aliens with fraudulent social security numbers.
supra note 32, at 275 (commenting that Proposition 187 was highly promoted by
local organization Save Our State); WONG, supra note 32, at 133 (noting that Proposition 187 "renewed attention to the ongoing problem of illegal border crossings from Mexico, as did several highly publicized attempts to land boats filled with
illegal immigrants from China"). California's then-governor, Pete Wilson, supported Proposition 187, and it passed with 59% of the vote. See TICHENOR, supra
note 32, at 277 (noting effect of support from California governor); WONG, supra
note 32, at 133 (same).
51. See TICHENOR, supra note 32, at 277 (discussing impact of 1994 bombing of

World Trade Center on issue of illegal immigration).
52. See id. at 278-85 (discussing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996).
53. Id. at 283-84 (focusing on impact of IIRIRA). The law was deeply supported and, as a bill, passed the House of Representatives with a 333 to 87 vote and
the Senate with a 97 to 3 vote. See id. at 283 (detailing final amendments to Immigration Act of 1996 and its subsequent vote). The law has been regarded as "a
pyrrhic victory for restrictionists." See id. at 284 (relating opinion towards Immigration Act of 1996).
IIRIRA also added new bars to admission for illegal citizens because now, (1)
if an immigrant were present in the United States for 180 days or less, then he or
she would need to wait three years before being eligible for citizenship; or (2) if an
immigrant were present in the United States for more than a year, then he or she
would need to wait ten years before gaining eligibility. See WONG, supranote 32, at
135 (outlining IIRIRA's achievements). The Act also increased border patrol
agents by 5,000. See id. (same).
54. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTAcKs UPON THE UNITED STATES (OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT

1-14 (U.S. Government Printing Office 2004) (summarizing plane
hijackings and terrorists' attacks on United States).
55. See id. (describing September llth attacks).
EDITION),

56. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 4 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,

780 (explaining that five social security numbers associated with 9/11 terrorists
appeared to be counterfeit).
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Consequently, Congress passed the Patriot Act. 57 The Patriot Act, among
other initiatives, intends to prevent terrorists from gaining entry into the
United States. 58 It targets illegal immigration and calls for better implementation of existing immigration laws. 5 9 The Patriot Act also calls for
better and more sophisticated forms of identification in order to prevent
60
counterfeiting and identification theft.
Subsequently, in 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, 6 1 which further benefits illegal immigration enforcement. 62 The REAL ID Act mandates national standards for drivers' licenses, and required states'
compliance by 2008.63 Additionally, the information presented on the li64
censes must be stored in a national database.
B.

Current Political Climate

The majority of Americans remain dissatisfied with Congress's efforts
to control illegal immigration-and with good reason. 65 The Department
57. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (providing legislative response to 9/11 terrorists' attacks).
58. See Margaret L. Lorenc, Comment, The Mark of the Beast: U.S. Government
Use of REID in Government-Issued Documents, 17 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 583, 590
(2007) ("The Act called for the implementation of existing immigration laws in
order to stop the entry of illegal aliens into the country and, ultimately, to prevent
terrorists from gaining entry.").
59. See id. (discussing Patriot Act).
60. See id. ("The Act demanded a new level of security for documents used at
ports of entry into the country that would prevent counterfeiting or tampering, be
machine-readable, and able to interface with multiple agency data-processing
initiatives.").
61. The REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (enacting
further requirements on immigration).
62. See id. (providing detailed description of REAL ID Act); see also Lorenc,
supra note 58, at 593 ("The REAL ID Act of 2005 was passed following the 9/11
Commission's recommendations that identification documents be made more secure from forgeries by terrorists and illegal aliens."). One commentator explained
that the Act was included in a military spending bill for Iraq because there was
uncertainty whether the Act would survive the Senate. See Lorenc, supra note 58, at
593 (explaining passage of REAL ID Act).
63. See Lorenc, supra note 58, at 593 (noting objective of REAL ID Act). The
mandated standards required that drivers' licenses "include a minimum amount of
information about the card-holder, '[physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent
purposes,' and some kind of machine-readable technology." Id. at 593 (outlining
standards for identification system).
64. See id. (same).
65. See, e.g.,
Poll: Americans Want Fewer Illegal Immigrants in U.S., CNN.coM, Oct.
17, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/17/poll.immigration/index.html?
iref=newssearch (reporting that in 2007 majority of Americans wanted fewer illegal
immigrants in country and three in ten wanted illegal immigrants deported); Study
Finds Gap in U.S. Views of Immigration, CNN.coM, Dec. 17, 2002, http://archives.
cnn.com/2002/US/12/17/immigration.opinion/index.html (presenting Center
for Immigration Studies report that 60% of ordinary Americans viewed illegal immigration as threat, while only 14% of "elites" or opinion leaders including union
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of Homeland Security reported that the illegal immigrant population in
the United States increased from 8.5 million in 2000 to 11.8 million in
2007.66 Of the 11.8 million illegal immigrants present in 2007, 35% entered the United States afterJanuary 1, 2000, despite contemporary immigration reform. 6 7 Prior to the 2008 presidential election, voters in
numerous polls ranked the problem of illegal immigration ahead of taxes,
education, and the environment; illegal immigration ranked behind only
68
One
the economy, the War in Iraq, the energy crisis, and healthcare.
well-respected poll reported that 59% of registered voters ranked the 2008
presidential candidates'-then-Senator Barack Obama and Senator John
McCain-positions on the issue of illegal immigration as either "extremely
important" or "very important" in determining how they would cast their
69
vote.

officials, journalists, clergy, members of Congress, corporate leaders, and academicians viewed illegal immigration as threat).
66. See HOEFER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1 (providing statistics on illegal immigration in United States). The estimated breakdown of the country of origin for
the 11.8 million illegal immigrants residing in the United States in 2007 is: Mexico-6,980,000; El Salvador-540,000; Guatemala-500,000; Philippines290,000; China-290,000; Honduras-280,000; Korea-230,000; India-220,000;
Brazil-190,000; Ecuador-160,000; and all other countries totaled 2,100,000. See
id. at 4 (estimating breakdown of illegal immigrations by country of origin). From
2000 to 2007, the five largest increases in illegal population by origin, relative to
the country of origin's level in 2000, were: Brazil (89% increase), India (81% increase), Guatemala (74% increase), Honduras (70% increase), and Mexico (49%
increase). See id. (computing relative increase in illegal immigration population
from 2000 to 2007 by country of origin). Of the 11.8 million illegal immigrations
in the United States in 2007, approximately 2,840,000 (or 24%) resided in California, 1,710,000 (or 14%) resided in Texas, and 960,000 (or 8%) resided in Florida.
See id. (presenting state of residence for illegal immigrants). Also, according to the
report, 36% (or 4,200,000) of the illegal immigrants were between twenty-five and
thirty-four years old and 30% (or 3,540,000) were younger than twenty-five. See id.
at 5 (providing breakdown by age).
67. See id. at 1 (explaining that nearly 4.2 million (or 35%) of the total illegal
immigrant population in 2007 entered in 2000 or later).
68. See CBS News/New York Times Poll, Oct. 25-29, 2008, available at http://www.
pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (listing voters' top priorities as economy (55%),
terrorism (13%), healthcare (9%), energy policy (7%), war in Iraq (6%), and illegal immigration (4%)); CNN/Opinion Research CorporationPoll, Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (listing voters' top priorities for president as economy (57%), war in Iraq (13%), healthcare (13%), terrorism (10%), and illegal immigration (5%)); NBC News/Wall Street JournalPoll Aug.
15-18 2008, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (listing voters'
top priorities for federal government as economic growth (27%), energy policy
(18%), healthcare (14%), war in Iraq (13%), terrorism (9%), and illegal immigration (8%)).
69. See USA Today/Gallup Poll,June 15-19 2008, availableat http://www.polling
report.prioriti.htm (reporting that presidential candidates' positions on "illegal
immigration" were "extremely" to "very important" to 59% of voters when deciding
whom to vote for).
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Congress's recent efforts at comprehensive immigration reform have
failed. 70 For example, in 2005, Senators Ted Kennedy and John McCain
presented a bipartisan bill that would have provided comprehensive immigration reform through "earned adjustment," rather than amnesty, but the
bill failed to achieve majority support. 7 1 After the Kennedy-McCain bill's
failure, Congress passed the far less comprehensive Secure Fence Act of
2006,72 which provides funding for a fence along the United States border
with Mexico that included unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based
73
sensors, satellites, radar, and cameras to prevent illegal immigration.
Then in 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced the Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (IRA2007), regarded as a more conservative
version of the Kennedy-McCain Bill of 2005.74 Nevertheless, IRA2007
70. See Maurice Hew, Jr., The Fence and the Wall (Mart)... MaginotLine Mentality, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1383, 1386 (2007) ("President BusH's push for 'pro-immigration reform' has not materialized following the tragic events of September 11,
2001."); Dana Bash & Andrea Koppel, Senate Immigration Bill Suffers CrushingDefeat,
CNN.coM, June 28, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/06/28/immigration.congress/index.html (noting failure of Congress to overhaul current immigration laws); Editorial, Illegal Immigration-Remember Reform?, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 3, 2008, at A08 ("Congress has repeatedly failed to address the need
both to provide a process for illegal immigrants to become legal and to make it
more difficult for them to illegally enter the United States.").
71. See S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing immigration reform); Shawn
Zeller, Bill Would Tighten Border Security, Increase Information Sharing, GOVERNMENTExECUTIVE.COM 1, May 12, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/story-page-pf.
cfm?articleid=31247&printerfriendlyvers=1 (discussing McCain-Kennedy immigration bill). Under the bill, named the Secure America and Orderly Immigration
Act, a new type of visa would be established that would, "allow low-skilled foreign
workers who have lined up jobs in the United States to come for three years. The
visa could be renewed once for an additional three years. Illegal workers now in
the United States would apply for H-5B visas that would be valid for six years. After
the visa terms expire, immigrants could either return home or apply for permanent residence, and ultimately, citizenship." See Zeller, supra, at 1 (explaining new
visa that would help reduce number of illegal immigrants by giving them path to
citizenship). The bill would also increase funding for border security and "allow
illegal immigrants who pay fines and fees of at least $2,000, take English and civics
courses, and undergo medical and background checks, to apply for green cards
and eventually citizenship." Id. (detailing other aspects of proposed legislation).
72. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638 (authorizing installation of fencing to control illegal immigration).
73. See id. (authorizing construction of fence along United States/Mexico
border); Jonathan Weisman, With Senate Vote, CongressPasses BorderFence Bill, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at Al (reporting that "Senate gave final approval last night to
legislation authorizing the construction of 700 miles of double-layered fencing on
the U.S.-Mexico border").
74. See S.9, 110th Congress (2007) (proposing comprehensive immigration
reform); Deborah White, Pros and Cons of the Immigration Reform Act of 2007,
ABOUT.COM 1, http://usliberals.about.com/od/immigration/i/BushImmiReform.

htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) (reviewing positives and negatives of Immigration
Reform Act of 2007 (IRA2007)).
The IRA would have accomplished the following: (1) extended to illegal immigrants the opportunity to obtain a "' visa and achieve legal status after paying
$5,000 in fines and $2,000 in processing fees; (2) created a guestworker program;
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failed to gain majority support in the Senate and died before a final
75
vote.
Regardless, the perceived general inadequacy of Congress's legislation in reducing illegal immigration has spurred state officials and private
citizens to action. 76 For example, volunteer border patrol groups like the
Minutemen have formed and sought to take matters into their own
hands. 7 7 The Minutemen assert that their mission is to "see the borders
and coastal boundaries of the United States secured against the unlawful
and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign
78
military."
Additionally, small towns, like Hazelton, Pennsylvania, are attempting
to provide their own solutions to curtail the continued tide of illegal immigration and its perceived vices. 79 In July 2006, Hazelton's mayor, Louis J.
(3) required employers to verify all employees' identification with a federal electronic clearing system; (4) altered the existing structure of the visa program to
favor highly-skilled workers; and (5) increased border security, including the construction of almost four-hundred miles of walls along the United States-Mexican
border. See White, supra, at 1 (detailing Immigration Reform Act of 2007).
75. See Bash & Koppel, supra note 70 (reporting demise of Immigration Reform Act of 2007).
76. SeeJohn M. Broder, Immigration,From a Simmer to a Scream, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2006, at 1 (discussing rise of citizen-groups that opposed illegal immigration).
77. See id. (focusing on "Minutemen"). According to the article, late in 2004 a
"citizen army" organized and named themselves the Minutemen. See id. (detailing
formation of Minutemen). Subsequently, they held their first rally in April of 2005
in Tucson, Arizona and received substantial media coverage. See id. (describing
Minutemen's first rally which drew "a few hundred volunteers in pickups and
R.V.'s, armed chiefly with lawn chairs and binoculars," who were followed by an
army of reporters "who could not resist the tale of Wild West vigilantes"). The
movement obtained support from politicians and media figures. See id. ("Arnold
Schwarzenegger, the California governor, praised their movement, and Lou Dobbs
of CNN began devoting hours on his evening program to what he calls broken
borders.").
78. Minutemen HQ http://www.minutemanhq.com/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2008) (serving as official webpage of Minutemen group). The Minutemen Civil
Defense Corps have local chapters in all fifty states. See MCDC Local Chapters,
http://www.minutemanhq.com/hq/local.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) (provid-

ing links to news from all local Minutemen chapters).

WHILE THE MINUTEMEN

CLAIM TO BE PREPARED TO "EMPLOY ALL MEANS OF CIVIL PROTEST, DEMONSTRATION,
AND POLITICAL LOBBYING TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL," THEY ALSO OPERATE AN ARMED
BORDER PATROL WITH THE INTENT TO APPREHEND ANYONE ATTEMPTING TO ILLEGALLY

ENTER THE COUNTRY. See Minutemen HQ supra (asserting methods through which

Minutemen will pursue their mission); Borderops.com, http://borderops.com/index.php?option=com content&task=blogsection&id=13&ltemid=102 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2009) (providing example of Minutemen's recent efforts). According to
the Minutemen's official website, they have sighted 30,671 illegal immigrants attempting to cross the border, made 326 rescues, and apprehended 13,710 intruders during their four years of existence. See Minutemen HQ supra (detailing
success of organization).
79. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(holding that Hazleton's ordinances targeting illegal immigrants were preempted
by federal immigration policy and unconstitutional). HAZELTON, LIKE MANY SMALL
TOWNS IN THE UNITED STATES, OFFERS BOTH AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT
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Barletta, introduced a strict ordinance against illegal immigrants after two
were charged with the murder of a city resident. 80 The ordinance, titled
the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, penalized both businesses
that hired illegal immigrants by suspending their business permits and
landlords who rented to people without occupancy permits, which could
only be obtained by legal immigrants and citizens of the United States. 8 1
Although the legality of these local efforts is questionable because of federal preemption, they remain strong examples of the level of discontent
8 2
amongst United States citizens.
Thankfully, while politicians remain divided on a solution, they agree
that the current system is not working and recognize that a majority of the
country is demanding change. 83 For example, the Republican Party, in its
official platform, recently asserted that "[i]n an age of terrorism, drug cartels, and criminal gangs, allowing millions of unidentified persons to enter
and remain in this country poses grave risks to the sovereignty of the
United States and the security of its people." 84 The Democratic Party's
website also explains that "our current immigration system has been broken for far too long. We need comprehensive immigration reform, not
AND, AS A RESULT, IT HAS BEEN ATrRACTIVE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WHO HAVE

GRATED TO THE SMALL TOWN EN MASSE SINCE

MI-

2001. See id. at 484 (noting that Hazle-

ton experienced post-September 11, 2001 increase in population by United States

citizens, lawful permanent residents, and undocumented immigrants seeking
housing and employment); see, e.g., Amrutha Nanjappa, Current Developments in the
JudicialBranch: The Recent Decision:Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
693, 693-94 (2007) ("Hazleton's immigrant community, constituting approximately a third of its total population, was drawn to the city by affordable housing
and local jobs."). By 2006, APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF THE TOWN'S POPULATION
WHICH COINCIDED WITH A RISE IN CRIME. See
Nanjappa, supra, at 693-94 (citing Julia Preston, Judge Voids Ordinances on Illegal
CONSISTED OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS,

Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at Al4) (explaining "[s] upporters of the ordinances argued that illegal immigration was overburdening the schools and hospitals and increasing crime").
80. See id. at 693 (citing David G.Savage & Nicole Gaouette,Judge Reects Hazleton Law on Immigrants; A City Cannot Take Such a National Issue Into Its Own Hands,
He Says, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A20) (discussing impetus for Hazleton
ordinances).
81. See id. at 694 (detailing ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCE).

82. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (holding that Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 expressly preempts local immigration laws).
83. See Broder, supra note 76, at 4:1 (discussing polarized political environment); Juan Williams, Immigration: The Next Civil Rights Battlefield, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2008, at 1 (noting "immigration is the civil rights issue of today").
84. The Platform Committee, 2008 Republican Platform 3 (Bill Gribbin ed.,
2008) available at http://www.gop.com/pdf/PlatformFINAL WithCover.pdf (asserting Republican Party platform on immigration).

The Republican Party ex-

plained that "[a]s long as jobs are available in the United States, economic
incentives to enter illegally will persist" and, therefore, the government is required
to empower employers and show a commitment to law enforcement, which "means
smarter enforcement at the workplace, against illegal workers and lawbreaking employers alike, along with those who practice identity theft and traffic in fraudulent documents." Id. (emphasis added) (discussing how to effectuate Republican Party's
objectives regarding illegal immigration).
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just piecemeal efforts. We cannot continue to allow people8 5to enter the
United States undetected, undocumented, and unchecked.
Consequently, in order to make progress on immigration reform,
Congress needs legislation that can achieve bipartisan support.8 6 The
Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act 87 (ITPEA) provides just that type
of opportunity for bipartisan support.88 ITPEA is capable of rising above
partisan politics because it focuses on protecting victims of illegal immigration.8 9 In order for Congress to understand the value of ITPEA to the
solution for illegal immigration, it must first understand the recently discovered shortcoming of ITPEA; for that reason, Part III synthesizes the
circuit courts' opinions related to the circuit split.90

85. The Democratic Party, Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.dem-

ocrats.org/a/national/american-community/immigration/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2008) (asserting Democratic Party's position on immigration reform). The Democratic Party condemned both illegal immigrants and their employers because
"those who enter our country's borders illegally, and those who employ them, disrespect the rule of the law." See id. (arguing need for immigration reform). To
achieve the party's objective on illegal immigration, it asserted that:
We need to dismantle human smuggling organizations, combating the
crime associated with this trade. We also need to do more to promote
economic development in migrant-sending nations, to reduce incentives
to come to the United States illegally. And we need to crack down on
employers who hire undocumented immigrants. It's a problem when we
only enforce our laws against the immigrants themselves, with raids that
are ineffective, tear apart families, and leave people detained without adequate access to counsel. We realize that employers need a method to verify whether their employees are legally eligible to work in the United
States, and we will ensure that our system is accurate, fair to legal workers,
safeguards people's privacy, and cannot be used to discriminate against
workers.
Id. (discussing how to effectuate Democratic Party's objectives regarding illegal
immigration).
Then-presidential candidate Barack Obama stated during his acceptance
speech for the party nomination that "[p]assions fly on immigration, but I don't
know anyone who benefits when a mother is separated from her infant child or an
employer undercuts American wages by hiring illegal workers." Then-Senator Barack Obama, Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech (Aug. 8, 2008), available
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/28/barack-obama-democratic-c-n_
122224.html (accepting Democratic presidential nomination).
86. For a discussion of the need for the Republican opposition to recent immigration legislation and the need for bipartisan support, see infra notes 192-94
and accompanying text.
87. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (ITPEA), Pub. L. No. 108-275,
118 Stat. 831, 831 (2004) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)).
88. For a discussion of ITPEA's ability to attract bipartisan support, see infra
notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of the victimization of identity theft and effectiveness of
ITPEA, see infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
90. For a synthesis of the circuit courts' interpretations of ITPEA, see infra
notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
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III.

IDENTITY THEFT PENALTY ENHANCEMENT ACT

The relevant text of ITPEA targets a person who "knowingly transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person" during one of the enumerated underlying offenses. 9 1
The circuit courts are divided over whether the government must prove

that the person who committed identity theft during one of the underlying felonies knew the stolen identity belonged to an actual person. 92 The
Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the government does
not need to prove the defendant actually knew the stolen identity belonged to another person. 93 The First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
taken the position that the government must prove that the defendant
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (1) (2006) ("In general. Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.").
The underlying felonies listed in subsection (c) are "relating to theft of public
money, property, or rewards," "relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication
by bank officer or employee," "relating to theft from employee benefit plans," "relating to false personation of citizenship," "relating to false statements in connection
with the acquisition of a firearm," "relating to fraud and false statements," "relating
to mail, bank, and wire fraud," "relating to nationality and citizenship," "relating to
passports and visas," "relating to obtaining customer information by false pretenses," "relating to willfully failing to leave the United States after deportationand creating
a counterfeit alien registration card," "relating to various immigration offenses," and "to
false statements relating to programs under the Act." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) (2006)
(emphasis added).
For the purpose of ITPEA, "means of identification" is defined as "any name
or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information,
to identify a specific individual." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(d) (7) (West 2008). Examples
of "means of identification" include "name, social security number, date of birth,
official State or government issued driver's license or identification number, alien
registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number," as well as other electronic and physical identifiers, like fingerprints. Id. § (d) (7) (A)-(D). According to the Supreme Court, "'[k]nowledge' and
'knowingly' are normally associated with awareness, understanding, or consciousness." Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (citing
A.MERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 725 (1981); BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004); WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-

1252-53 (1993)).
92. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that
"[t]he circuits are divided on the issue of whether the 'knowingly' scienter requirement in § 1028A(a) (1) extends to 'of another person'").
93. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that "§ 1028A(a) (1) is unambiguous and that the Government was not
required to prove that [the defendant] knew that [the victim] was a real person to
prove he violated § 1028A(a) (1)"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15, 2008) (No.
08-5316); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (lth Cir. 2007) (holding
defendant need not be aware identification documents were assigned to real individual to satisfy knowledge requirement), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (2008);
United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).
TIONARY
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knew the means of identification actually belonged to another person. 9 4
This Comment's synthesis of the circuit courts' opinions, which includes
consideration of ITPEA's plain language, title, surrounding text, legislative
intent, the rule of lenity, and relevant Supreme Court precedent, demonstrates that the expansive scienter requirement enunciated by the First,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is the best reading of the statute. 95 Sadly, this
reading will render ITPEA impotent in dealing with the common situation
of an illegal immigrant utilizing a random identification number or card
96
that actually belongs to a real person.
A. Plain Language of the Text
All statutory interpretation begins in the same place: the plain language of the text.97 The plain language of ITPEA's text, however, is ambiguous. 98 The plain language is susceptible to two equally plausible, but
contrary interpretations: (1) "knowingly" does not reach "of another per94. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (relying on rule of lenity, court held that, because of ambiguity in language of text, statutory structure, title, and legislative history, "the scienter requirement must stretch to 'of another person'"); United
States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on rule of
lenity because of ambiguity in statute's language and legislative history, court held
"that the government was required to prove that [the defendant] knew that the
identification belonged to another person"); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo,
515 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that "[v]iewing the list in combination with the statute's title and the legislative record as a whole, we think it clear
that Congress never intended its 'aggravated identity theft' statute to reach conduct like [the defendant's]"), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2008) (No. 08-622).
95. For a synthesis of the circuit courts' opinions, see infra notes 98-151 and
accompanying text.
96. For a discussion of the impotency of ITPEA under this interpretation in
dealing with identity theft incident to illegal immigration, see infra notes 188-205
and accompanying text.
97. See Watson v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 579, 583 (2007) (citing Lopez v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179
(1995); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)) (explaining that when terms are not
statutorily defined, interpretation begins with "the language as we normally speak
it"). A deeply held rule of statutory interpretation is that when a statute is clear
and unambiguous on its face, a court "need not and cannot" interpret the statute;
only statutes "which are of doubtful meaning are subject" to courts' interpretations. See NoemA1' J. SINGER & J.D.

SHAMBLE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND

§ 45:2 (7th ed. 2007) (citing Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345,
357 (1956) ("But we must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the
consequences.")) (discussing problem of ambiguity in statutes).
98. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 (finding text of ITPEA to be ambiguous); MiSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

randa-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1040 (same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1241 (discussing
guidance Supreme Court precedent has provided to interpret ambiguous statutes). Ambiguity exists when the statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses." SINGER & SINGER,
supra note 97, § 45:2 (discussing ambiguity in statutes).
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son;" and (2) "knowingly" modifies everything, including "of another
99
person."
The narrow reading is supported by classic Supreme Court precedent,
which holds that the interpretation of the statute should be as close to the
grammatical reading as possible.' 0 0 If the statute is examined through a
purely grammatical lens, "knowingly" is an adverb and therefore only
modifies the verbs "transfers, possesses, or uses," and certainly not "of another person," the statute's second prepositional phrase.' 0 ' The Supreme
99. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1237 (recounting proposed antithetical
readings of statute). As evidenced by the appeals, some criminal defendants argue
that "knowingly" must modify "of another person," which would require the government to prove the defendant knew the means of identification belonged to
another person. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 53-54 (explaining issue under appeal); Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1038 (explaining government and defendants' conflicting
interpretations of statute); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915
(8th Cir. 2008) (noting that defendant "argues that the term 'knowingly' modifies
not only 'transfers, possesses, or uses' but also the phrase 'of another person'"),
petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S.July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at
1237 (explaining that defendant contended that "the statute is ambiguous and
that the provision's title, purpose, and legislative history reveal Congress's intent to
extend the mens rea requirement throughout the entire sentence, namely all the
way to 'of another person'"); see, e.g., United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 608
(11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting defendant's argument government needed to prove
defendant knew identification belonged to actual person), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct.
2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).
In contrast, the government has consistently contended that "knowingly" does not
reach "of another person." See Godin, 534 F.3d at 56 (explaining that government
argued that "knowingly" only modifies verbs); Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915
(same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1237 (noting that government asserted that
scienter requirement extends only to "means of identification"); Montejo, 442 F.3d
at 217 (explaining government's narrow reading of ITPEA).
100. See United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897) ("The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is
to be found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar."); Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662,
670 (1889) ("To get at the thought or meaning expressed in a statute, a contract,
or a constitution, the first resort, in all cases, is to the natural signification of the
words, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them.").
101. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 56 ("In a purely grammatical sense, 'knowingly,' as
an adverb, modifies only the verbs 'transfers, possesses, or uses.'"); Mendoza-Gonza/ez, 520 F.3d at 915 (asserting that "knowingly" is an adverb and it grammatically
modifies only the verbs in the statute); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238 (citing
ROBERT FUNK ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF GRAM IAR FOR WRITERS 62 (MacMillan
1991)) ("The word 'knowingly' technically modifies only the verb that follows it
('uses'). It modifies neither the direct object ('means') nor the two prepositional
phrases that follow ('of identification of another person'."); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at
609 ("The fact that the world 'knowingly'-an adverb-is placed before the verbs
...indicates that 'knowingly' modifies those verbs, not the later language in the
statute."); Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215 (citing FUNK ET AL., supra, at Ch. 4) ("Good
usage requires that the limiting modifier, the adverb 'knowingly,' be as close as
possible to the words which it modifies, here, 'transfers, possesses, or uses."). But
see Miranda-Lopez,532 F.3d at 1038-39 (arguing that limited scienter requirement is
not only plausible and grammatically correct interpretation of statute).
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Court, however, has not always confined its statutory analyses to the rules
of grammar when interpreting a scienter requirement, but has equated
"modify" "with words such as 'apply,' 'extend,' or 'attach." 0 2
Here, a loose grammatical interpretation is necessitated by the fact
that the scienter requirement must extend at least to "of identification," or
else the statute would criminalize "a person . . . 'knowingly us[ing] or

transfer[ring],' without lawful authority, anything at all that happened to
contain a means of identification." 1 0 3 The scienter requirement could
An "adverb" is "a word that modifies an adjective, verb, or another berg, expressing a relation of place, time, circumstance, manner, cause, degree, etc., e.g.
gently, accordingly, now, here, why." See E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford Guide to English
Usage, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE xvii (defining "adverb").
A "prepositional phrase" is "a phrase consisting of a preposition and its complement, e.g. I am surprised at your reaction." See id. at xxi (defining "prepositional
phrase"). A "preposition" is "a word governing a noun or pronoun, expressing the
relation of the latter to other words, e.g. seated at the table." See id. (defining
"preposition"). A "direct object" is "the object that expresses the primary object of
the action of the verb, e.g. He sent a present to his son." See id. at xviii (emphasis
added) (defining "direct object").
102. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238 (citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)) (interpreting broadest scienter requirement
into statute concerning child pornography); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 424-25 (1985) (interpreting broadest scienter requirement into statute
criminalizing usage of government food stamps); United States v. Nofziger, 878
F.2d 442, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that Supreme Court precedent has examined modifiers "more loosely" than grammatical meanings); see also Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705-07 (2005) (interpreting broadest
scienter requirement into statute criminalizing aspects of white collar crime);
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267-68 (2000) (interpreting broadest scienter
requirement into statute criminalizing bank robbery).
Goldbergand Rollins may still control, urging the narrowest interpretation possible, because Arthur Andersen, Carter,X-Citement Video, and Liparotaare legitimately
distinguishable. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 917 (distinguishing Court's analysis of underlying statute in Arthur Andersen, X-Citement Video, and Liparota cases
from ITPEA); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1258-61 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing Court's analysis of underlying statute in Clark, X-Citement Video, and
Liparota cases from ITPEA); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609-10 (distinguishing Court's
analysis of underlying statute in X-Citement Video and Liparota cases from ITPEA);
Monteo, 442 F.3d at 216 (distinguishing Court's analysis of underlying statute in
Liparota case from ITPEA). In each of the four cases, the Supreme Court attempted to avoid potentially criminalizing a range of innocent conduct, which is
not a concern with a penalty enhancement. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706
(remedying jury instructions that covered innocent conduct); Carter, 530 U.S. at
269 (reading general intent scienter requirement into statute in order to "separate
wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent conduct'"); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S.
at 70 ("Our reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened by our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly
applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them."); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (arguing that broad scienter requirement "is
particularly appropriate where, as here, to interpret the statute otherwise would be
to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct"). For a discussion of
Arthur Andersen, Carter, X-Citement Video, and Liparota, see infra notes 152-62 and
accompanying text.
103. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238 ("As the government concedes, the
mens rea requirement must extend at least to the direct object's principal modi-
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stop there and the statute would be intelligible; however, with respect to
"of another person," recent Supreme Court precedent has interpreted

1 04
"knowingly" as expansively as possible in analogous criminal statutes.
Three circuit courts have acknowledged and embraced this expansive interpretation, which increases its credibility. 10 5 The expansive interpretation is also supported by alternative, but grammatically consistent, rewrites
of the statute, which would easily solve the ambiguity. 10 6 Thus, the plain

ier, 'of identification.' Were it otherwise, a person could be convicted for 'knowingly us[ing] or transfer[ring],' without lawful authority, anything at all that
happened to contain a means of identification."); see Godin, 534 F.3d at 57-58
(agreeing that scienter requirement must extend at least to "means of identification"). Also, in order for the sentence to be intelligible, the scienter requirement
must extend at least to "of identification." See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238
(arguing that scienter requirement "must also reach beyond the bare direct object
'means' to its first modifying phrase 'of identification,' lest the sentence become
gibberish: 'knowingly using a means' means nothing").
104. For a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, see infra
notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
105. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 57-58 (citing United States v. Godin, 476 F. Supp.
2d 1, 2 (D. Me. 2007)) (providing example to support argument). The necessity of
these conclusions is demonstrated by an example from a district court:
If during a bank conspiracy, I hand a defendant a sealed envelope asking
her to transfer it and its contents to another and she knowingly does so,
she has knowingly transferred the envelope and its contents. But, if she
believes my statement that the envelope contains only a birthday card
when in fact it contains a forged social security card, the government
surely would not contend that she should receive the enhanced penalty.
Id. at 58 (same); see also id. at 57 (citing X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 79 (Stevens,J,
concurring) (arguing that statutory sentence is "not very long (fifteen words out of
a forty-seven word sentence), and it is one phrase out of four within the same
sentence. There are three additional phrases in the same sentence to which 'of another person' does not belong. It is as reasonable to read 'knowingly' to extend to
all of the words within the phrase it inhabits as it is to further divide the phrase and
limit the reach of 'knowingly' to just a portion of the phrase.")); Villanueva-Sotelo,
515 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424) ("Congress has not explicitly
spelled out the mental state required. Although Congress certainly intended by
use of the word "knowingly" to require some mental state with respect to some element of the crime defined in [the statute], the interpretations proffered by both
parties accord with congressional intent to this extent. Beyond this, the words
themselves provide little guidance. Either interpretation would accord with ordinary
usage.").
106. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1239 (exploring alternative rewrites of
statute). For example, if Congress had written, "whoever knowingly uses ... another person's means of identification," then "the statute would most plausibly
require proof that the defendant actually knew the means of identification used
belonged to someone else." Id. (providing example of rewrite). According to the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, this rewrite supports the expansive reading of the statute because "the phrases 'means of identification of another person' and 'another person's means of identification' carry precisely the
same meaning." See id. (comparing rewrite with actual text of ITPEA).
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language of ITPEA is susceptible to contrary, but plausible interpretations
10 7
and is therefore ambiguous.
B.

Statute's Surrounding Language and Structure

If the plain meaning of the text is ambiguous, then courts must next
consider the statute's surrounding language and structure in order to resolve the ambiguity.10 8 Subsection 1028A(a) (2) of ITPEA utilizes similar,
but broader language than § 1028A(a) (1): "whoever, during and in relation to any [terrorism offense] knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a
false identification document' shall be imprisoned with a mandatory sentence
of five years which shall run consecutive to the underlying terrorism offense. 10 9 Section 1028A(a) (2), however, is also susceptible to contrary interpretations, both of which are equally plausible." 10 One interpretation,
favorable to an expansive scienter requirement in § 1028A(a) (1), extends
"knowingly" through "false identification document[s]" and includes all
the elements in between."' The second plausible interpretation limits
the scienter requirement to only the two direct objects and their primary
mcdifiers: "means of identification" and "false identification document." 112 Consequently, the surrounding language does not resolve the
113
textual ambiguity.
The title of the statute, "Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act," is
also available to help a court resolve the ambiguity in the text of subsection 1028A(a) (1).114 Unfortunately, the title is no less ambiguous because
107. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 (finding text of ITPEA to be ambiguous);
United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting different interpretations of ITPEA); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1241 (same).
108. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (instructing that
courts are to examine "the language and structure, legislative history, and motivat-

ing policies of the Act" to attempt to resolve statutory ambiguity in text).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (2) (2006) (emphasis added) ("Terrorism offense. Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section 2332b(g) (5) (B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person or a false identification document shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.").
110. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 (discussing § 1028A(a) (2) of ITPEA).
111. See id. (finding that " ' knowingly' can reasonably be read to extend to 'of
another person' because it reaches all the way to 'false identification document'").
112. See id. ("A second reasonable interpretation is that 'knowingly' only extends to the two direct objects and their primary modifiers: 'means of identification' and 'false identification documents.'").
113. See id. (explaining that statute's structure does not resolve ambiguity).
114. See id. (stating "[w]e may also look to the title of a statute to resolve
ambiguity in the text"); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1243
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234
(1998)) (noting that courts may use title of statute to resolve textual ambiguity);
Pa. Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) ("For interpretive
purposes, [the title is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word
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it can be interpreted either (1) literally, or (2) as a term of art. 1 5 If interpreted literally, "theft," is defined as "the felonious taking and removing of
personal property with the intent to deprive the rightful owner of it," which supports the more demanding expansive scienter requirement.1 16 For example, if this definition is controlling, then a defendant who randomly
selected a string of numbers to use as a social security or alien registration
number did not technically thieve an identity because the defendant did
not intend to deprive ?rty specific, rightful owner of the number. 11 7 In
other words, the defenctant would need to know that the identification
belonged to an actual person. 118 It is equally plausible, and perhaps more
likely, however, that "theft" will not be interpreted in isolation but as the
term of art "identity theft."1 19 Under this definition, identity theft could
or phrase."), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2008) (No. 08622).
115. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 (considering alternative readings of "identity
theft" in tide of statute).
116. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1243 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER ET AL.,
WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2369 (1993)) (presenting traditional definition of theft); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1516 (8th ed. 2000)
(defining theft). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) discusses identity theft
only in terms of identities that have been stolen. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
BUILDING A BETTER CREDIT REPORT, 19-21 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre03.pdf.
The FTC also provides several examples of how an identity thief may obtain identification information and in each example the thief would have known that the
identity belonged to another person; for example, the thief may get information
from businesses or other institutions by stealing it while he or she is on the job,
steal your wallet or purse, steal your personal information through email or the
phone by saying that he or she is from a legitimate company and claiming that you
have a problem with your account, steal your credit or debit card numbers by capturing the information in a data storage device in a practice known as "skimming,"
steal personal information he or she finds in your home, and/or steal your mail,
including bank and credit card statements, credit card offers, new checks,
and tax information. See id. (defining identity theft and explaining nature of
occurrences).

117. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1243 (discussing definition of theft in
relation to knowledge scienter requirement).

118. See id. (same).
119. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 ("It is also plausible that Congress intended to
define 'identity theft' as using someone else's identity rather than taking someone
else's identity."). For example, the harm is identical "whether someone (1) makes
up a social security number, procures credit with that number, and does not repay

or (2) steals a social security number from a database, procures credit with that
number, and does not repay." See id. (providing support for term of art definition
of identity theft).

Also, the House Report accompanying ITPEA explained that "[t]he term 'identity
theft' . .. refer[s] to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully obtains and
uses another person's personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception,
typically for economic or other gain, including immigration benefits," which notably does not explicitly include the scienter requirement at issue here. See H.R. REP.
No. 108-528, at 4 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780 (providing definition of identity theft). Furthermore, other sources, like the United States Department of justice, utilize Congress's definition. See United States Department of
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be defined as "using someone else's identity rather than taking someone
else's identity." 120 This definition supports the narrower reading of the
scienter requirement because it does not contain an inherent knowledge

requirement. 121
C.

Legislative Intent

In addition to using the structure of a statute and the surrounding
language in a statute to interpret ambiguous text, courts may also utilize
the legislative intent, an external source of interpretation, to resolve the
ambiguity.1 22 With respect to ITPEA's legislative history, support for the
Justice, Identity Theft and Fraud, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/websites/
idtheft.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) ("Identity theft and identity fraud are
terms used to refer to all types of crime in which someone wrongfully obtains and
uses another person's personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception,
typically for economic gain."). Congress defines identity theft more as a term of
art than as an actual theft, which supports no need for the expansive scienter requirement. See id. (discussing "identity theft" as term of art); see also Home Office
Identity Theft Steering Committee, Identity Theft-Identity Crime Definitions, http://
www.identity-theft.org.uk/identity-crime-definitions.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008)
("THIS is a generic term for identity theft, creating a false identity or committing
identity fraud."); Identity Theft, Identity Theft Definition, http://www.id-theft-info.
com/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) ("Identity theft-also known as identity fraud, ID theft and ID fraud-is fraud perpetrated by a criminal who assumes
someone else's identity in order to profit illegally .... [I]n simple terms, someone
pretends to be you in order to sign up for goods and services in your name-or
they may simply use your details to access your already existing bank and/or credit
card accounts.").
120. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 (giving alternate definition for "identity theft").
121. See Identity Theft and Fraud,supra note 119 (noting that Congress defines
"identity theft" as term of art, supporting no need for expansive scienter
requirement).
122. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 390-98 (1980) (examining statute in question's legislative history in attempt to resolve textual statutory ambiguity). Separation of powers principles require utilizing legislative history to
interpret statutes because the court should recognize the will of the lawmaking
branch of the government. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, § 45:5 (discussing

basis for utilizing legislative history). In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts
should look to the "objective to be attained, the nature of the subject matter and
the contextual setting, . . . [and] review the policy behind the statute, the legislative scheme .... [the] legislative history .... prior enactments .... [and] commit-

tee reports." See id. (noting sources for ascertaining legislative intent).
It is important to acknowledge, however, that Supreme Court justices disagree
as to whether, if the plain language of the text, surrounding text, and title of the
statute each fail to resolve the ambiguity, courts should look to legislative history
or, at this stage of hierpretation, immediately apply the rule of lenity. See Honorable Patricia M. Wald, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991-1992 Term, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 238, 252-53 (1993) (citing United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311-12
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (noting thatJustices Scalia and Thomas argued
that courts should not consult legislative history); see also RONALD BENTON BROWN
& SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLA-

INTENT 12 (2002) ("The idea that the legislature has one state of mind or
'legislative intent' when voting a bill into law is fiction. It consists of many people,
each with his or her own mind. Each legislator's different 'state of mind,' may
have nothing to do with the content of the statute. Supporters of a bill are likely to
TIVE
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expansive, more conservative, scienter requirement may be found in what
the legislative history does not say-at no point in the legislative history is
the scienter requirement considered or addressed. 123 At best, during the
bill's presentation to the House of Representatives, Congressman Sensenbrenner explained that identity theft is a term "used to refer to all types of
crime in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person's
personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for
economic or other gain including immigration benefits" and that "[t]his
legislation will allow prosecutors to identify identity thieves who steal an
identity, sometimes hundreds or even thousands of identities, for purposes
of committing one or more crimes."1 2 4 Likewise, Congressman Carter,
one of the bill's cosponsors, said both that ITPEA would "facilitate the
prosecution of criminals who steal identities in order to commit felonies"
and that "if a thief uses the stolen identity in connection with another
Federal crime and the intent of the underlying Federal crime is proven,
the prosecutor may not need to prove the intent to use the false identity in
a crime." 125 These portions of the legislative history appear to place emphasis on theft, rather than a more loosely defined "identity theft;" however, neither actually discussed the breadth of the scienter requirement or
conclusively demanded an exacting standard of knowledge from future
26
defendants.1
In the same vein, with respect to the scienter requirement, is the
Committee of the Judiciary Report, which accompanied the final version
of the bill and merely explained further that the statute's purpose is to
"[address] the growing problem of identity theft," and is a response to
identity thieves receiving short terms of imprisonment and probation
be quite familiar with a bill's contents and have particular intent with regard to its
meaning, whereas many legislators will not. Some may vote for the statute despite
its meaning because of a political deal with the bill's proponents. Others may vote
against the bill intending for it to have no effect."); SINGER & SINGER, supra note
97, § 45:6 ("Since intention is a mental state and only individual persons have
minds, only an individual can have an intention. It follows then that the idea of a
legislative intent must be regarded as a fiction or a figure of speech."). For a discussion of the rule of lenity and how it applies to ITPEA, see infra notes 152-62 and
accompanying text.
123. See generally H.R. REP. No. 108-528 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779 (providing legislative history for Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act).
124. See 150 CONG. REG. H4809 (daily ed. June 23, 2004) (statement of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner) (emphasis added) (presenting Identity Theft
Penalty Enhancement Act to House of Representatives).
125. See 150 CONG. REc. H4810 (daily ed. June 23, 2004) (statement of Congressman John Carter) (emphasis added) (same).
126. Compare United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1243-45 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (discussing ITPEA's legislative history), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W.
3308 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2008) (No. 08-622), with 150 CONG. REG. H4810 (documenting
legislative report); see also United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 60 (lst Cir. 2008)
(concluding that legislative history does not resolve ambiguity); United States v.
Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (reaching same conclusion).
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before going on "to commit much more serious crimes.' 27 Accordingly,
ITPEA "provides enhanced penalties for persons who steal identities to
commit terrorist acts, immigration violations, firearms offenses, and other
serious crimes." 128 The "Performance Goals and Objectives" section only
explains that ITPEA "is intended to reduce the incidence of identity theft
and fraud and address the most serious criminals by providing stronger
penalties" for committing identity theft simultaneously with one of the un1 29
derlying offenses.
Also, the Committee of the Judiciary Report attempted to demonstrate the need for penalty enhancement by presenting eight cases where a
defendant was convicted of identity theft but received nominal or insufficient punishments. 130 In seven of the examples put forth by the bill's
127. See 150 CONG. REC. H4810, at 3 (contributing to legislative history).
128. See id. (same).
129. See id. at 10 (same). This section, however, may be construed to suggest
that ITPEA is intended to serve both strong retributive and deterrent goals. Such a
suggestion may favor the argument for a less stringent scienter requirement because enhancing the penalties that identity thieves receive should reduce the number of identity thefts. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 481, 1343 (8th ed. 2000)
(defining "retribution" as "[p]unishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the
offense committed; requital" and defining "deterrence" as "[t]he act or process of
discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear; esp., as a goal of criminal law,
the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment").
This assertion is consistent with the essence of deterrence theory, which this
Comment advocates. See Dane Archer et al., Symposium on Current Death Penalty
Issues: Homicide and the Death Penalty: a Cross-National Test of a Deterrence Hypothesis,
74 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 991, 991-92 (1983) (explaining basic deterrence theory). Deterrence theory advocates a relationship between the degree of punishment for a crime and the amount of incidence of the crime. See id. (same); see also
Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Imposing
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 20 n.96 (1998) (citing HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39 (1968)) ("DETERRENCE THEORY
posits that punishment is inflicted to deter future wrongdoing by the person being
punished (specific deterrence) and by others who might commit wrongs (general
deterrence)."). According to that relationship, if the punishment for a crime is
increased, then the incidence of the crime should decrease. See Archer, supra, at I
(same). It is worth noting, however, that deterrence theory relies on the belief
that "potential offenders" are "rational actors who weigh the qualities of potential
punishment before acting," which may not always be the case. See id. (same).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 5-6 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779, 781 (presenting "examples of instances in which persons involved in identity
theft received little or no prison time" in order to demonstrate need for penalty
enhancement).
In the first example, the defendant, an employee at Bally's Health Club, was
sentenced to only fifteen months in prison after he stole personal information
from club members and then provided the information to a terrorist who used the
identity information as part of a plot to blow up the Los Angeles International
Airport. See id. at 5 (listing examples of nominal or insufficient punishments for
identity thieves). In the second example, the defendant was sentenced to thirty-six
months' probation when identity thieves used a financial institution's clients' personal information to make illegal purchases after the defendant improperly accessed the financial institution's computer system, obtained personal information
from patrons, and provided it to another party. See id. (providing second exam-
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sponsors it seems that the convicted defendants knew the victims were actual persons, which would be consistent with the expansive scienter interpretation of the statute. 13 I The D.C. Circuit embraced this interpretation
of the report.' 32 In one of the examples, however, it is unclear whether
the defendant, when she used another person's social security number to
obtain employment while also receiving social security benefits, actually
knew the identity belonged to another person. 1 33 As a result, that list
merely may provide some of the worst examples of identity theft injustice,
and may not be exhaustive or exclusively illustrative of the application of
134
ITPEA.
On the other hand, support for the narrow scienter requirement may
be deduced from the fact that ITPEA replaced the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act. 13 5 In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act, which Congress passed in response to the
ballooning rate of identity theft in the United States and the lack of uniformity and effectiveness of state laws. 136 In the Act, Congress provided
ple). In another example, the defendant was sentenced to only fifteen months in
prison after he used the stolen identities of twenty-four people to file bogus federal
income tax returns in a multi-million dollar fraud scheme. See id. at 6 (providing
third example). In the next example, the defendant received only a ten-month
sentence after he stole a customer's social security number and used it to obtain
loans and lines of credit, on which he defaulted-thereby ruining the customer's
credit. See id. (providing additional example). In the fifth example, the defendant
was sentenced to serve twelve months' home-confinement, to serve five years' probation, and to pay restitution after she defrauded the government by receiving
Title II disability benefits while she continued to work as a science teacher under
her husband's social security number. See id. (same). In the sixth example, the
defendant received five years' probation and was forced to pay restitution after she
also defrauded the government when she used a stolen identity to apply for and
receive social security benefits. See id. (same). In the next example, the defendant, a Mexican resident, was sentenced to serve ten months' home-confinement,
to serve three years of non-reporting supervised release, and to pay restitution after
he used his deceased brother-in-law's name and social security number to receive
Title XVI benefits. See id. (same). In the last example, the defendant received five
years' probation and was forced to pay restitution for defrauding the government
by receiving social security benefits while she worked seasonally for the Internal
Revenue Service under another social security number. See id. (same).
131. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1244 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (noting that, in examples provided, "the thief knew the stolen information
belonged to another person-indeed, that was the very essence of the crime"),
petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2008) (No. 08-622).
132. See id. (same).
133. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that it
is unclear whether defendant knew that social security number belonged to real
person in scenario involving woman who used another's social security number in
order to procure employment).
134. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1255 (Henderson, C.J., dissenting) (refuting claim that Congress intended list to be exhaustive).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2003) (providing penalties for identity theft).
136. See R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent To Comply With HIPAA
and GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?,
49 VILL. L. REv. 625, 630 (2004) (explaining that "Congress proposed the ID Theft
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stiff penalties for identity thieves in hopes that the penalties would deter
future identity theft.1 3 7 The Identity Theft Act proved ineffective, however, because law enforcement officials found it impossible to enforce.1 38
As a result, identity thefts increased exponentially in the years after Congress enacted the Identity Theft Act.' 3 9 Congress subsequently passed
ITPEA to address the ineffectiveness of the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act. 1 40 ITPEA, unlike the Identity Theft Act, created a penalty
enhancement rather than simply criminalizing identity theft. 14 1 In light
of the difficulties faced in enforcing the Identity Theft Act, it is plausible
that if Congress embraced deterrence theory, then it would have favored a
narrower scienter requirement to alleviate the difficulties in the enforce14 2
ment of the Identity Theft Act when drafting ITPEA.
Nonetheless, any assertion regarding the scienter requirement is
based on flimsy evidence and is speculative at best because the scienter
requirement is not directly addressed and legitimate evidence continues
to support the two equally plausible interpretations of the statute's lan14 4
guage. 143 Thus, the ambiguity persists.
Act in March 1997 in response to the rapid rise of identity theft and the prevalence
of dissimilar laws among the states").
137. See id. (noting that "[t]he purpose of the Act was to criminalize identity
theft and . .. [t]he Act carries strong penalties for those convicted"). The Act
authorized penalizing convicted identity thieves with up to fifteen years in prison
and a $1,000 fine. See id. at 631 n.35 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (1) (D) (2000))
(outlining Identity Theft Act's penalties).
138. See id. at 632 ("The Act provides penalties that may suffice to deter, but
enforcing its provisions has proven to be difficult. Therefore, the Act's deterrent
effect failed to materialize."). According to McMahon, other shortcomings of the
Identity Theft Act include a failure to educate consumers and to compensate victims. See id. (discussing shortcomings of Identity Theft Act).
139. See id. (referencing FTC report documenting dramatic rise in reported
identity thefts following passage of Identity Theft Act). For further discussion of
the rise of identity theft in the United States since 2000, see supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text.
140. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 3 (2004), reprintedin 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
780 ("Currently under 18 U.S.C. § 1028 many identity thieves receive short terms
of imprisonment or probation; after their release, many of these thieves will go on
to use false identities to commit much more serious crimes.").
141. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2004) (creating penalty enhancement for aggravated identity theft), with 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2003) (criminalizing identity theft).
142. See McMahon, supra note 136, at 632 ("The Act provides penalties that
may suffice to deter, but enforcing its provisions has proven difficult. Therefore,
the Act's deterrent effect failed to materialize."). For further discussion of deterrence theory, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
143. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding
that legislative history does not resolve ambiguity); United States v. Miranda-Lopez,
532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (reaching same conclusion). For further discussion of how difficult it is to ascertain legislative intent and its arguable lack of
value, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 60 (reaching same conclusion); Miranda-Lopez, 532
F.3d at 1040 (same).
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D.

Rule of Lenity

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them."1 4 5 Thus, because a court may not reasonably
ascertain the breadth of the scienter requirement from its plain meaning
and other available sources, courts interpreting the scienter requirement
in ITPEA should ultimately interpret the scienter requirement according
to the rule of lenity. 146 Accordingly, courts should interpret ITPEA's sci147
enter requirement in favor of the defendant.
The expansive scienter requirement is the most favorable interpretation of ITPEA to the defendant. 14 8 The Supreme Court, when interpreting ITPEA's scienter requirement under the rule of lenity, should find
that ITPEA requires harsher sentences only for defendants who knew that
the identity that they used actually belonged to another person. 14 9 Thus,
in order to subject the defendant to the stern punishments of ITPEA, the
government must prove that the defendant knew the means of identification belonged to another person. 150 Accordingly, an immigrant, who illegally entered or remained in the United States, obtained documents he or
she knew were false, and used the identifications to further his or her illegal residency, could escape significant punishment if they believed the
identity contained in the documents could actually belong to someone, but
15 1
did not know for certain.
145. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion) (explaining rule of lenity).
146. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (relying on rule of lenity because of textual
ambiguity, statutory structure, title, and legislative history, court held that "the scienter requirement must stretch to 'of another person'"); Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d
at 1040 (relying on rule of lenity because of ambiguous statutory language and
legislative history, court held "that the government was required to prove that [the
defendant] knew that the identification belonged to another person"); United
States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that
where legislative history failed to resolve ambiguity, rule of lenity required court to
apply expansive scienter requirement), petitionfor cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 2008) (No. 08-622).
147. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (relying on rule of lenity); Miranda-Lopez, 532
F.3d at 1040 (same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246 (same).
148. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (interpreting scienter requirement expansively); Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1040 (same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246
(same).
149. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (interpreting scienter requirement expansively); Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1040 (same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246
(same).
150. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (interpreting scienter requirement expansively); Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1040 (same); Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246
(same).
151. See United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d. 603, 609 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (asserting that illegal immigrants will be able to "use the identification of another person fraudulently in the commission of another enumerated
felony so long as [they remain] ignorant of whether [the] other person is real"),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008).
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Escape Hatch? United States Supreme Court Precedent: Distinguishable?

If the Supreme Court, or any other court, disagrees with this Comment's analysis or the impact of the expansive scienter requirement, then
the Court likely will pursue the narrow reading of the scienter requirement by distinguishing the Court's precedent reading an expansive scienter requirement into ambiguous statutory language. 15 2 Under this judicial
analysis, the language of the ITPEA should be interpreted as close to the
grammatical reading as possible, which would extend "knowingly" only to
"means of identification" and not to "of another person."' 53 As discussed
earlier, the most relevant Supreme Court precedent-Arthur Andersen, LLP
v. United States,154 Carter v. United States,15 5 United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc.,' 56 and Liparota v. United States]57 -can be construed to support the
argument that the scienter requirement is ambiguous and ultimately
should be interpreted expansively. 15 8 Regardless, ITPEA is a penalty enhancement, and none of the four precedential decisions involved a penalty enhancement. 159 Also, in each of the four decisions, the Supreme
152. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 2008)
(distinguishing Arthur Andersen, X-Citement, and Liparota), petitionfor cert. filed, (U.S.
July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316); Hurtado,508 F.3d at 609-10 (distinguishing X-Citement
and Liparota);United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Liparota).
153. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 917 (distinguishing Arthur Andersen, XCitement, and Liparota); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609-10 (distinguishing X-Citement and
Liparota); Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217 (distinguishing Liparota).
154. 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (finding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) (2) (A)-(B) (2000) ambiguous and applying expansive scienter requirement).
155. 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2008) ambiguous and
applying expansive scienter requirement).
156. 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008) ambiguous and applying expansive scienter requirement).
157. 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1985) (finding 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (2000) ambiguous and applying expansive scienter requirement).
158. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (discussing how Supreme Court precedent supports expansive reading of
scienter requirement in ITPEA), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov.
7, 2008) (No. 08-622). For a discussion of Supreme Court precedent and how it
supports a finding of ambiguity, see supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
159. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2004) (imposing penalty enhancement of two mandatory years of imprisonment for anyone who "knowingly ...
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person"), with
Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 696 (2005) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) (2) (A)-(B) (2000), which made it crime for any defendant who
"knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades
another person ...with intent to" cause that person to withhold documents from,
or alter documents for use in, official proceeding), Carter v. United States, 530
U.S. 255, 255-56 (2000) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which criminalized
bank robbery), United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1994)
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which criminalized mailing or receipt of visual depiction of minor child engaged in sexually explicit acts), and Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 419 (1985) (interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b), which exposes
person who "knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or
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Court was concerned about how a narrow requirement would criminalize
unwitting, innocent conduct and, therefore, interpreted the scienter requirement as expansively as possible. 160 That is not a concern with
ITPEA, because it is only applicable when the defendant has (1) been
found guilty of an underlying felony; and (2) committed identity theft
during or in relation to that felony. 16 1 Consequently, the Supreme Court,
or any other court, could choose to distinguish the precedent, which
would severely weaken the argument that the plain language of the text is
ambiguous, bypass the need for this Comment's analysis, and favor the
162
narrow scienter requirement.
IV.

IDENTITY THEFT'S VICTIMIZATION AND

ITPEA's

OPPORTUNITY FOR

IMMIGRATION REFORM

It is unclear whether the Supreme Court will ultimately distinguish
the relevant precedent; therefore, Congress should intervene and affirmatively establish a narrow scienter requirement in ITPEA because identity
theft victimizes innocent, unsuspecting people and poses significant risks
to both the economy and national security, especially with respect to illegal immigrants. 16 3 For example, more generally speaking, the Federal
authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations").
160. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703 (acknowledging fear of criminalizing
unwitting, innocent conduct when Court read "knowingly" expansively); Carter,
530 U.S. at 267-69 (interpreting scienter requirement expansively to separate innocent conduct from criminal conduct); X-Citement, 513 U.S. at 64 (seeking to avoid
criminalizing innocent conduct); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25 (noting that narrow
scienter requirement would criminalize "a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct").
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (1) (2004) (requiring conviction underlying felony and subsequent conviction under penalty enhancement).
162. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that "§ 1028A(a) (1) is unambiguous and that the Government was not
required to prove that [the defendant] knew that [the victim] was a real person to
prove that he violated § 1028A(a) (1)"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15, 2008)
(No. 08-5316); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (11th Cir. 2007)
(same), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213,
217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).
163. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 4-6 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779, 780-82 (presenting impact of identity theft on national security and economy). For a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court precedent and whether it is
distinguishable, see supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
Common examples of how identity thieves obtain victims' personal information for exploitation include stealing wallets and purses containing identification
and credit and bank cards, stealing mail, including bank and credit card statements, pre-approved credit offers, telephone calling cards and tax information,
completing a "change of address form" to divert personal mail to another location,
rummaging through personal trash, or the trash of businesses, for data in a practice known as "dumpster diving, fraudulently obtaining credit reports by posing as
landlords, employers, or someone else who may have a legitimate need for the
information, getting business or personnel records at work, finding personal information in a home, intercepting information on the internet, buying personal in-
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Trade Commission (FTC) estimated the loss to businesses and financial
institutions from identity theft to be approximately $47.6 billion and the
cost to individual consumers to be approximately $5 billion.1 64 The FTC
also estimated that 8.3 million adults discovered in 2005 that they were
victims of identity theft. 165 Those victims experienced upwards of $13,000
16 6
in damages and spent as many as 55-130 hours resolving the problem.
Some victims even experienced non-economic damages such as having
their utilities cut off, being denied credit, being subjected to criminal investigation, being arrested, and suffering harassment from collection
agencies. 167 Furthermore, the terrorists involved in the 1994 bombing of
the World Trade Center and those connected with the September 11,
168
2001 attacks utilized identity theft.
With respect to illegal immigration, however, the modern intersection
with identity theft was the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), which introduced sanctions for employers who hire and exploit
illegal immigrants. 169 Relatively well-paying employment is the primary
formation from "inside" sources, illegally obtaining tax information or credit
reports by claiming to have a legal right of access to these records, or posing as
telemarketers to obtain personal information. See MARGARET C. JASPER, OCEANA'S
LAW FOR THE LAYPERSON:

IDENTITY THEFT AND HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF

1-2

(2002) (presenting ways identity thieves obtain peoples' identities for exploitation). For a further discussion of how identity thieves obtain personal information, see supra note 116.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 4 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
780 (recognizing general economy and individual consumers' economic losses).
165. See SYNOvATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY

4 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O07/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf (reporting that 8.3 million United States adults discovered
that they were victims of some form of identity theft in 2005). Of that group, 3.2
million reported that their victimization was limited to one or more of their existing credit accounts, 3.3 million reported misuse of a non-credit card account,
and 1.8 million reported that their personal information had been used to open a
new financial account. See id. (categorizing victims of identity theft).
166. See id. at 5 (providing chart on costs of identity theft). According to the
report, the median value of goods and services stolen by identity thieves was $500,
but for 5% the amount was $13,000. See id. (same). Also, while most victims paid
little or no out-of-pocket expenses, for 5% of victims that amount was $2,000. See
id. (same). Out-of-pocket expenses for victims included any lost wages, legal fees,
payment of fraudulent debts, and miscellaneous expenses such as those from notarization, copying, and postage. See id. at 6 (explaining findings related to out-ofpocket expenses). For victims, the median amount of hours spent resolving their
problem was four hours, but for 5% of all victims it was 130 hours. See id. at 4
(detailing time spent solving issues arising out of identity theft).
167. See id. at 7 (noting problems that victims reported other than direct or
out-of-pocket damages).
168. See BR1GGS, supra note 1, at 277 (considering impact of 1994 bombing of
REPORT

World Trade Center on illegal immigration); H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 4 (2004),
reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780 (discussing fraudulent social security numbers for September 11 terrorists).
169. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (updating immigration law). For a discussion of IRCA, see
supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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incentive for illegal immigrants to enter the United States and expose
themselves to criminal consequences because the countries they leave be170
hind typically have weak economies with high levels of unemployment.
For example, in 2007, the United States' gross domestic product per capita was $45,800 and its unemployment was about 4.6%, but Mexico's gross
domestic product per capita was only $12,400 and, while its unemployment was 3.7%, 40% of the population suffered from asset-based poverty. 17 1 Under IRCA, for the first time, illegal immigrants needed to
provide documentation in order to obtain or maintain their employment,
which generated an ever-increasing demand for fraudulent identification
because employers had to verify the eligibility of their employees. 172 Regrettably, that demand has been easily met, as demonstrated by Mr.
170. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-723(i), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649-50) (explaining Immigration Reform and Control Act). For a list of the
countries from which most illegal immigrants immigrate, see supra note 66.
In 2005, identity theft for the purposes of obtaining employment accounted
for 1% of the total incidents. See SYNOVATE, supra note 165, at 21 (providing statistics on identity theft). That number may change, however, given the increase in
the number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids targeted at employers
of illegal immigrants. See Anna Gorman, Theft of Identity Compounds the Crime, L.A.
TIMES.,July 9, 2007, at B3 (reporting that "[u]nder pressure from federal authorities to verify their workers' legal status, more employers are checking the validity of
Social Security numbers, and that has caused many ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS to use stolen rather than made-up numbers to get jobs, immigration officials said"); Jean
Hopfensperger, Agents Intensify Hunt for Illegal Immigrants, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 22,
2007, at BI (reporting increase in raids against illegal immigrants resulting from
increase in Immigration and Customs Enforcement funding). For example,
around the start of 2008, federal agents in Dallas, Texas arrested at least twentyeight people in an identity theft ring designed to provide illegal immigrants with
employable identifications. See Underground Crime Ring: Immigrants Steal Identities;
Employers Look Away, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 9, 2008, at 12A (editorializing
busted identity theft crime ring in Dallas). Employers, such as Wal-Mart and Swift,
were involved in the raids. See id. (same).
171. Compare Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United
States, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/us.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2009) (detailing statistics on United States),
with Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Mexico, availableat https:/
/www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.htm
(last updated Feb. 24, 2009) (detailing statistics on Mexico). Gross domestic product per
capita is the average income of a typical person in an economy. See Mike Dowling,
Mr. Dowling's Interactive Table of the Nations of the World, http://www.mrdowling.com/800nations.html (last updated June 29, 2006) (providing economic statistics on countries and defining important terms). For a list of the countries from
which most illegal immigrants immigrate, see supra note 66. The disparity in
wealth between the United States and Mexico is analogous to the disparity with the
other top countries from which illegal immigrants immigrate. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Field Listing-GDP-per capita (PPP), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2004.
html (last updated Feb. 24, 2009) (listing GDP per capita for every country).
172. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (updating immigration law). For a discussion of IRCA, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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Montejo, who simply walked into the United States and purchased the
false Alien Registration and Social Security cards for $60.173
It is currently unknown how many of the at least 11.8 million illegal
immigrants in the United States are utilizing fraudulent identification, let
alone how many are involved in identity theft. 174 Regardless of their number, those involved in identity theft possess a great deal of power over their
unsuspecting victims, whether or not the thieves are aware of their victims'
existence. 175 The victims, however, are not always who you would expect. 176 For example, one day Camber Lybbert, a mother living in Utah,
received a call from her bank questioning why it had Mrs. Lybbert's threeyear-old daughter's social security number on its files for two credit cards
and two auto loans, with an outstanding balance exceeding $25,000.177
An investigation revealed that Joe Tinoco, an illegal immigrant living in
the United States, had been using Mrs. Lybbert's daughter's social security
number to obtain "ajob, to get a car, and provide for his family."1 78 Unfortunately, despite the absence of malicious intent by Mr. Tinoco, it took
the Lybberts five months to remedy their three-year-old daughter's credit,
as Mrs. Lybbert "spent 30 hours or more a week making telephone calls,
'179
feeling passed from one agency or voice-mail system to another.
Identity theft creates the potential for countless additional victims.18 0
An illegal immigrant can also cause harm by utilizing someone else's identity for employment purposes when the victim is unable to work and receiving social security benefits from the government.18 ' If the illegal
immigrant is using that victim's social security number to work, eventually
173. See United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 2006) (reciting
case facts). For a discussion of Montejo, see supranotes 2-8 and accompanying text.
174. See generally MARTI DINERSTEIN, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, AMERICAN'S IDENTITY CRISIS: DOCUMENT FRAUD IS PERVASIVE AND PERNICIOUS (2002), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back302.pdf (discussing identity theft by
illegal immigrants in United States); HOEFER ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (providing
statistics on illegal immigration into United States).
175. SeeJASPER, supra note 163, at ix (explaining that victims of identity theft
"bear the tremendous emotional burden that identity theft causes, including loss
of reputation, damage to their credit rating, and the time, expense and nuisance
of trying to clear their name"); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 4-6 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780-82 (presenting impact of identity theft on

national security and economy).
176. SeeJohn Leland, Stolen Lives: Some ID Theft Is Not for Profit, but to Get a Job,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,2006, at Al (presenting story of Camber Lybbert whose three
year-old daughter had her identity stolen by illegal immigrant).
177. See id. (recounting phone call from bank).
178. See id. (describing immigrants' motivation for stealing three-year-old's
identity).

179. See id. (explaining actions taken by Lybbert's to solve problem).
180. See Max Anderson, Has YOUR Social Security Number Been Stolen for
Employment Fraud?, IDENTr YTHEFTFixEs.coM, July 19, 2006, http://www.identity

theftfixes.com/identity-theft-can-costyou-more-than-just-your-creditscore.
html (describing scenario where illegal immigrant using identity to procure employment could be damaging).
181. See id. (same).
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the Social Security Administration may inquire into whether the victim is
defrauding the government. 18 2 This could lead to many problems for the
victim, including the potential loss of necessary disability benefits. 1 8 3 Additionally, if an illegal immigrant commits a crime and gives a victim's
identification to authorities when arrested, a later arrest warrant may be
issued in the victim's name and the victim's information will be entered in
the National Crime Information database, which can have serious repercussions. 184 Furthermore, once an illegal immigrant possesses someone
else's identity, the immigrant can use the identity to open a bank account,
obtain credit, apply for a bank or department store credit card, or lease an
apartment or car.185 The illegal immigrant could then obtain money,
goods, or services in the victim's name, which could destroy the victim's
credit. 186 These examples illustrate that illegal immigration is absolutely
i8 7
not a victimless crime, as some assert.
182. See id. (discussing action Social Security Administration will take when
investigating fraud claims).
183. See Social Security Law Attorney, Social Security Disability Fraud Attorney, http://www.socialsecuritylawattorney.com/Social-Security-Disability-Fraud-Attorney.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (advertising for victims of disability fraud).
184. See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, CounteractingIdentity Fraud in the
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'V 661, 666-67 (1999) (citing Rogan v. City of Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp.
1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987)) (recounting story of Terry Rogan, who had his identity
stolen by criminal). In 1981, a criminal escaped from an Alabama prison, obtained a copy of Rogan's birth certificate and began using Rogan's identity in California after obtaining a driver's license and identification in his name. See id. at
666 (discussing how criminal stole Rogan's identity). In 1982, the criminal was
arrested by Los Angeles Police on suspicion of murder, released, and later had an
arrest warrant issued against him in Rogan's name for two robbery-murders. See id.
(explaining why warrant was issued in Rogan's name). Subsequently, the police
entered the warrant into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
database, which alerts all police officers across the country to the existence of the
warrant. See id. (describing why Rogan's name was in NCIC). Over the next year,
Terry Rogan was arrested four times, twice at gunpoint, in Michigan and Texas by
police responding to the outstanding warrant. See id. at 666-67 (recounting Rogan's arrests stemming from warrant information on NCIC).
185. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft
Problem, 80 TEx. L. REv. 89, 90-91 (2001) (describing scheme most commonly used
by identity thieves).
186. See id. at 91 (detailing what thief can do with stolen identity). The commentator noted that under this scenario, identity theft has two victims: (1) the
person who is impersonated; and (2) the firm that extends credit to the impersonator because it will not recover that credit. See id. (noting victims of identity theft).
Typically, impersonated victims do not need to repay for the goods and services,
but may suffer secondary effects, such as harassment by a collection agency. See id.
(explaining secondary effects to impersonated victims). A collection agency can
initiate collection against the victim, which will involve phone calls, written demands for payment, refusal to extend credit, legal action, credit reporting and, in
extreme cases, may render the victim unemployable or subject to imprisonment.
See id. (listing potential damage to identity theft victims).
187. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2171, 2246
(2005) (arguing that lack of enforcement of IRCA suggests Americans view illegal
immigration as "victimless crime"); Larry Obhof, The Irrationalityof Enforcement? An
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If the Supreme Court adopts a broad interpretation of the scienter
requirement, as this Comment advises against, illegal immigrants will be
able to "use the identification of another person fraudulently in the commission of another enumerated felony so long as [they remain] ignorant
of whether [the] other person is real." 188 In other words, illegal immigrants, as well as analogous identity thieves, could ultimately escape the
penalty enhancement's stern punishment, despite illegally entering the
United States, knowingly obtaining false documents, being aware that the
identities could actually belong to someone, and using those identities to
further their illegal residency.1 8 9 In the words of one circuit court judge,
this presents the government with an "often impossible burden" of "proving beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the thousands, if not millions,
of holders of false green cards knows that the false means of identification
he possesses is that 'of another person."190 Even the First Circuit, which
held in favor of the expansive scienter requirement, acknowledged that
"Congress arguably intended 'aggravated identity theft' to cover both the
Economic Analysis of U.S. Immigration Law, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 176 (2002)
(asserting that "the view of illegal immigration as 'victimless crime' is quite wide-

spread"). For a discussion of the possible net economic benefit of illegal immigration to the United States, see Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic of Illegal
Immigration, 26 CouNs. ON FOREIGN REL. 3-34 (Apr. 2007) (arguing that illegal immigration is beneficial to United States economy and tighter restrictions would be
detrimental).
188. See United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d. 603, 609 (lth Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of narrow scienter requirement), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (2008).
Currently, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari in order to resolve the
circuit split. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.
2008) (interpreting scienter requirement expansively), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609 (same); United States v.
Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).
Identity theft by illegal immigrants is not the only type of identity theft that
will be more difficult to prosecute under the narrow scienter requirement. See
generally United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (involving bank fraud).
For example, in Godin, Ms. Cori A. Godin successfully used the narrow scienter
requirement to avoid punishment under ITPEA for defrauding eight banks credit
unions. See id. at 54 (recounting facts of case). Ms. Godin altered her own social
security number to fabricate seven different numbers, one of which actually belonged to someone else. See id. (describing fraudulent actions taken by Godin).
With that number, Ms. Godin opened a bank account. See id. (explaining identity
theft). The First Circuit reversed Ms. Godin's conviction under ITPEA because the
government failed to prove that she knew the number belonged to a real person.
See id. at 53-54 (providing roadmap for opinion).
189. See generally Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609 (discussing impact of narrow scienter requirement).
190. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1255 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Henderson,J., dissenting) ("Except for the forger himself, proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that each of the thousands, if not millions, of holders of false
green cards knows that the false means of identification he possesses is that 'of
another person' would 'place on the prosecution [a]n often impossible burden'"
(citing United States v. Chin, 981 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992))), petition for
cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2008) (No. 08-622).
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crime committed by" the forger/seller of the fraudulent identification
"and [the crime] committed by the undocumented immigrant."1 1
Consequently, ITPEA presents an opportunity for immigration reform because of identity theft's victimization and ITPEA's adverse impact. 19 2 Senator David Vitter of Louisiana, who is credited with leading
the opposition that killed the Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (IRA2007),
stated that "the American people want [Congress] to start with enforcement, both at the border and at the workplace, and don't want promises.
They want action, they want results, they want proof, because they've
heard all the promises before."1 9 3 In a government that relies on compromises and coalitions, a revision to ITPEA could appease those calling
with its
for stricter enforcement and enable a revised version of IRA2007,
19 4
earned-citizenship, to finally achieve the requisite support.
This argument is bolstered by the success of ITPEA in combating the
more common forms of identity theft. 195 The FTC reported that from
191. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 60 ("Congress arguably intended 'aggravated iden-

tity theft' to cover both the crime committed by the third party and that committed by the undocumented immigrant").
192. Bash & Koppel, supra note 70 (reporting Senate's failure to pass Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (IRA2007)). The vote was forty-six to fifty-three, fourteen shy of the requisite amount to pass the bill onto the House of Representatives.
See id. (describing voting results). Senator Charles Schumer of New York, a supporter of IRA, noted that "[e]veryone knows that our immigration laws are broken
and a country loses some of its greatness when it can't fix a problem that everyone
knows is broken. And that's what happened today." See id. (providing Senator
Schumer's analysis of failed vote). For a discussion of IRA2007, see supra notes 7475 and accompanying text.
193. See id. (quoting Senator Vitter's analysis of defeat of IRA2007); Bruce
Alpert, Immigration Bill Fades Away; Vitter Has Key Role in Defeat of Measure, TIMESPICAYUNE, June 29, 2007, at 1 (reporting on Senator Vitter's role in defeat of Immigration Reform Act of 2007).
194. See id. (noting senators' optimism that future comprehensive immigration bill would pass). In the wake of the bill's demise, supporters of IRA2007
called on their colleagues to next time pass legislation that would work. See id.
(describing future wishes of IRA2007 supporters). Senator Edward Kennedy optimistically explained that "[y]ou cannot stop the march for progress in the United
States, and on this issue, I have every hope and every expectation that we'll be
ultimately successful." See id. (presenting Senator Kennedy's optimism "that the
fight over immigration was a step forward that could ultimately lead to new laws
within the next few years").
195. See SvNovATE, supranote 165, at 4 (providing statistics on identity theft in
United States). ITPEA is a major tool in the fight against identity theft, but it is not
the government's only tool. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (2008) (granting general power to fight deceptive and unfair trade practices);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2008) (limiting liability of credit cardholders to $50 for unauthorized use of credit card); Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(u) (2008) (targeting identity
theft and providing for credit history restoration); Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1693(g) (2008) (limiting consumer liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (2008) (protecting online collection and disclosure of information
of children under thirteen years of age); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
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2003 to 2005 the percentage of the population experiencing identity theft
dropped from 4.6% to 3.7%, the average amount obtained by a thief
dropped from $4,789 in 2003 to $1,882 in 2005, and total losses from identity theft dropped from $47.6 billion in 2003 to $15.6 billion in 2005.196
Therefore, clarifying the circuit split in support of the narrow scienter requirement, which might be achieved by moving the underlying immigration felonies to the broader § 1028A(a) (2), could be equally effective in
97
reducing the identity theft related to immigration violations.'
Insufficient punishment leaves perpetrators free to quickly reenter
the United States illegally, as demonstrated by Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo, who
entered the United States three times. 1 98 Under the narrow scienter requirement, however, illegal immigration would no longer be a low-risk,
high-reward game, where, if caught, the illegal immigrant can avoid
ITPEA's penalty enhancement by claiming ignorance of the victimization
of a real person.1 99 The narrow scienter requirement would essentially
U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) (prohibiting computer intrusion, damages, and access beyond authorization); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102521 (2008) (prohibiting unauthorized interception and disclosure of electronic
communications transmitted or stored on covered networks); Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(providing tools to combat and prevent terrorism).
196. See SYNOVATE, supra note 165, at 4 (comparing incidence of identity theft
between 2003 and 2005).
197. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2008) ("In general. Whoever, during
and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years."), with 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (2)
(2008) ("Terrorism offense. Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section 2332b(g) (5) (B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a false
identification document shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years." (emphasis added)).
198. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (recounting facts of case), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Nov.
7, 2008) (No. 08-622). Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo pleaded guilty to the charge that he
committed fraud and misuse of a visa, permit, or other document, but under that
charge the judge has discretion on sentencing and Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo will be
eligible for parole, despite his identity theft. See id. at 1250 (noting that Mr. Villanueva-Sotelo did not totally escape punishment under expansive scienter requirement); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2008) (criminalizing fraud related to and
misuse of visas, permits, and other documents). ITPEA, a penalty enhancement,
however, was enacted in response to other criminal statutes offering insufficient
retribution because judges failed to grasp the gravity of the crime and provided
nominal sentences to identity thieves. See H.R. REP. No. 108-528, at 5 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781 (presenting "examples of instances in which
persons involved in identity theft received little or no prison time" in order to
demonstrate need for penalty enhancement).
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b) (2008) (providing for mandatory two
year term of imprisonment to run consecutively to underlying offense and denying
any opportunity for probation).
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make identity theft a dangerous game where all that matters is that the
illegal immigrant used someone else's identity; knowledge of that fact
would be irrelevant. 20 0 For example, under the narrow scienter requirement, if the illegal immigrant purchased a random means of identification
at the border for $60 and the identity actually victimized a real person,
typically a United States citizen or legitimate immigrant, then the immi20 1
grant would face ITPEA's penalty enhancement.
Although the pen:!ty enhancement may not dissuade everyone, this
could become a strong deterrent for many because a conviction under
ITPEA mandates a two-year term of imprisonment that must run consecutively to the underlying offense, without opportunity for parole.20 2 That
penalty enhancement, although requiring one of the underlying convictions, is a powerful disincentive for illegal immigrants seeking employment in the United States because they would be cut off from their
families and livelihood, and face deportation immediately following their
extended imprisonment. 20 3 Consequently, by increasing the risk of a conviction and the severity of the subsequent punishment for employment
related identity theft, ITPEA can decrease the attractiveness of seeking employment in the United States, which is the chief incentive for illegal immigration, as well as protect unaware, innocent victims. 20 4 Thus, the
easier it is to penalize identity thieves under ITPEA, the more effective it
20 5
should be at curbing illegal immigration.
V.

CONCLUSION

Citizens of the United States have called for comprehensive immigration reform in response to the continuous tide of illegal immigrants flood200. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008)
(holding that "§ 1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous and that the Government [is] not
required to prove that [the defendant] knew that [the victim] was a real person to
prove that he violated § 1028A(a) (1)"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15, 2008)
(No. 08-5316); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that "[the defendant] did not need to know that [the victim] was a real
person to violate § 1028A(a) (1)"), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (2008); United States
v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that "the defendant need
not be aware of the actual assignment of the numbers to an individual to have
violated [§ 1028A(a) (1)]").
201. See generally Montejo, 442 F.3d at 213-17 (finding ITPEA unambiguous
and requiring narrow scienter requirement).
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a) (1), (b) (2008) (providing for mandatory two
year term of imprisonment to run consecutively to underlying offense and denying
any opportunity for probation). For a discussion of deterrence theory, see supra
note 129.
203. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008) (providing conditions for deportation
of immigrants, including commission of felony and document fraud).
204. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-723(i), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649-50) (noting that "employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here
illegally").
205. For a discussion of deterrence theory, see supra note 129.
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ing the country. 20 6 Regrettably, over the last decade, Congress has
repeatedly failed to sufficiently answer the demands and concerns of its
constituents, who are calling for stiffer legislation responsive to the problem of illegal immigration. 20 7 Fortunately, the recent circuit split over
ITPEA, a penalty enhancement, which criminalizes aggravated identity
theft, provides an opportunity for Congress to finally provide sufficient
and comprehensive immigration reform. 208 ITPEA requires that a defendant has been convicted of both an underlying felony enumerated in
ITPEA and aggravated identity theft under ITPEA before the penalty enhancement is triggered. 209 Once triggered, ITPEA is not only fair, but
powerful because those subject to the penalty enhancement face a
mandatory two-year term of imprisonment, which must be served consecu2 10
tively to the underlying felony, without parole.
The recent circuit split, however, is over whether the government
needs to prove that the defendant, when committing an identity theft,
2 11
In 2009 the
knew the fraudulent identity belonged to an actual person.
in
ambiguity
inherent
the
regarding
this
split
Supreme Court will resolve
212
indicourts'
opinions
the
circuit
of
Unfortunately, a synthesis
ITPEA.
cates that the Court will likely need to rely on the rule of lenity to resolve
the ambiguity.2 1 3 A resolution that relies on the rule of lenity will be unfavorable to United States' citizens and legitimate immigrants because it per2 14
petuates illegal immigrants' ability to commit identity theft.
206. For a discussion of public sentiment towards illegal immigration and the
tide of illegal immigration into the United States, see supra notes 65-69, 76-82 and
accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of contemporary legislative reaction to the negative public sentiment regarding illegal immigration and its rejection by the United States,
see supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
208. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining
that "[tihe circuits are divided on the issue of whether the "knowingly" scienter
requirement in § 1028A(a) (1) extends to "of another person"). For a discussion
of the opportunity ITPEA presents for immigration reform in the United States,
see supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b) (2008) (providing for mandatory two
year term of imprisonment to run consecutively with underlying offense and denying any probation opportunity). For a discussion of ITPEA, see supra notes 91-162
and accompanying text.
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b) (2008) (explaining punishment of
ITPEA).
211. For a discussion of the circuit split related to ITPEA, see supra notes 91151 and accompanying text.
212. See Supreme Court to Decide, supra note 27 (reporting on Supreme Court
granting certiorari on identity theft issue); see also United States v. Flores-Figueroa,
274 Fed. Appx. 501 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding narrow scienter requirement), cert.
granted, 129 S.Ct. 457 (2008).
213. For a synthesis of the circuit courts' opinions and the likely holding of
the Supreme Court, see supra notes 91-151 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the impact of the expansive scienter requirement, see
supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
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If Congress intervenes, however, as this Comment recommends, and
resolves the circuit split in favor of a narrow scienter requirement by
clearly not requiring the government to prove that the defendant knew the
identification belonged to a real person, then Congress would effectively
increase the likelihood that illegal immigrants utilizing false identification
to obtain work and government benefits would face substantial punishment. 215 This is important because illegal immigrants often purchase a
fraudulent identification document or select a random social security
number to further their illegal residency without ever knowing whether
the identification belongs to a real person.2 1 6 Despite the absence of malicious intent by an illegal immigrant in this common scenario, United
States citizens and legitimate immigrants are increasingly victimized by
this form of identity theft.2 17 The narrow scienter requirement in ITPEA
would curb illegal immigration by ending the low-risk, high-reward scenario illegal immigrants currently face when they enter the United States
2 18
seeking employment.
According to government statistics, since ITPEA's implementation,
identity theft has decreased in the United States.2 1 9 A correlation exists
and therefore, when viewed through a deterrence theory lens, the argument can be made that ITPEA has proven to be effective at reducing identity theft generally. 220 As a result, a strengthened, or favorably clarified,
ITPEA may be further effective at reducing illegal immigration into the
United States because illegal immigrants rely on identity theft in order to
gain employment. 22 1 Their need for identity theft is the result of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, passed by Congress in 1986, which
introduced sanctions for employers who hire and exploit illegal immi215. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that "§ 1028A(a) (1) is unambiguous and that the Government was
not required to prove that [the defendant] knew that [the victim] was a real person to prove that he violated § 1028A(a) (1)"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15,
2008) (No. 08-5316); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (11th Cir. 2007)
(same), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213,
217 (4th Cir. 2006) (same).
216. For examples of illegal immigrants utilizing random identification,
which actually belonged to real people, see supra notes 2-16 and accompanying
text.
217. For a discussion of the victimization of identity theft and the harm to
which illegal immigrants expose their victims, see supra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the impact of the narrow scienter requirement on
illegal immigration, see supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of the current state of identity theft in the United States,
see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the current state of identity theft in the United States
and its relation to ITPEA and other federal statutes that directly or indirectly address identity theft, see supra notes 163-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion of deterrence theory, see supra note 129.
221. For a further discussion of how illegal immigrants utilize identity theft in
the United States, see supra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
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grants. 222 The legislation was impactful because the primary incentive for

illegal immigrants to enter the United States is the hope of obtaining rela22 3
tively well-paid employment.
Furthermore, after the demise of IRA2007, opponents of the bill
called for stricter enforcement mechanisms to be included in any illegal
immigration reform legislation. 224 A revised ITPEA could serve that function because it has already proven successful in other contexts and likely
fulfills Congress's original intent for ITPEA. 225 Also, if ITPEA satisfies the
opponents of IRA2007 in Congress, then ITPEA could be vital in the future passage of a revived IRA2007, which originally included powerful
tools for illegal immigrants who have long resided in and contributed to
22 6
the United States to gain citizenship or legal immigrant status.

Therefore, Congress has the opportunity to provide a significant response to the demands for immigration reform by proactively resolving
any ambiguity in ITPEA before the Supreme Court has the opportunity to
reach an unfavorable resolution. 22 7 If Congress acts quickly and effectively by updating ITPEA and resolving the circuit split in favor of the narrow scienter requirement, then Congress can impact the chief incentive
for illegal immigrants entering the United States and stem the tide of illegal immigration. 228 This legislation will be viewed favorably by vast segments of society, increase our national security and economic stability, and
restore public confidence in the government's ability to respond to con229
cerns over continued illegal immigration.
Matthew T. Hovey

222. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (updating immigration law). For a discussion of IRCA, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
223. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-723(i), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649-50) (noting that "employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here
illegally").
224. See Bash & Koppel, supra note 70. For a discussion of the opposition to
IRA2007, see supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
225. For discussion of the success of ITPEA, see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of IRA2007, see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
227. For a discussion of Congress's opportunity to reform immigration, see
supra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
228. For a discussion of how a narrow scienter requirement in ITPEA can
effect employment of illegal immigrants, see supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
229. For a discussion of the positive impact of the narrow scienter requirement, see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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